

# **Uncle Sam says, "I Want You!" - The Politics of the Draft and National Service**

**A Monograph  
by  
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**AY 04-05**

# REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

*Form Approved  
OMB No. 074-0188*

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE 052605	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Monograph	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Uncle Sam says, "I Want You!" - The Politics of the Draft and National Service		5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) COL William Raymond, Jr.			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College School of Advanced Military Studies 250 Gibbon Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES			
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT ( <i>Maximum 200 Words</i> ) There currently appears to be a widespread general consensus among politicians, military leaders and academics that the military draft is no longer a viable policy option for the United States in the twenty-first century. Despite this general consensus against the draft and given the questionable viability of the all-volunteer force (AVF), this monograph explores the critical question: Is a military draft still a viable manpower policy for the United States?  The framework for analysis combines Professor John Kingdon's notion of policy windows and Carl von Clausewitz' "paradoxical trinity." A detailed analysis of the four major draft enactments/periods in U.S. history: Civil War, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War will show that the factors that resulted in a military draft in our nation's past are just as relevant in the twenty-first century. Given the unique demands of the global war on terrorism, a volunteer national service program that calls for military or civilian service is needed, even though the current political climate appears to offer little chance of enactment and acceptance. A volunteer national service program could consist of four types of service: the military, AmeriCorps, homeland security, and the Peace Corps.			
14. SUBJECT TERMS Military draft, conscription, national service		15. NUMBER OF PAGES 66	
		16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT U	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE U	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT U	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT none

# **SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES**

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Uncle Sam says, “I Want You!” – The Politics of the Draft and National Service

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## **Abstract**

UNCLE SAM SAYS, “I WANT YOU!” – THE POLITICS OF THE DRAFT AND NATIONAL SERVICE by COL William. M. Raymond. Jr., United States Army, 66 pages.

Nearly everyone has seen the recruiting poster with Uncle Sam pointing directly at you and declaring “I Want You!” This broad patriotic appeal touches upon some very fundamental questions: Who serves in the military (i.e., everyone or only certain individuals, volunteers or conscripts)? What are the obligations of a citizen to the state? Which has a higher priority among the democratic values of liberalism and egalitarianism? The answers to these questions provide insights to how our nation decides to man its armed forces.

There currently appears to be a widespread general consensus among politicians, military leaders and academics that the military draft is no longer a viable policy option for the United States in the twenty-first century. Despite this general consensus against the draft and given the questionable viability of the all-volunteer force (AVF), this monograph explores the critical question: Is a military draft still a viable manpower policy for the United States?

The framework for analysis combines Professor John Kingdon’s notion of policy windows and Carl von Clausewitz’ “paradoxical trinity.” A detailed analysis of the four major draft enactments/periods in U.S. history: Civil War, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War will show that the factors that resulted in a military draft in our nation’s past are just as relevant in the twenty-first century. A brief discussion on the adoption of the AVF and recent legislative efforts to return to a military draft or creation of a national service program provide additional insights to answering the monograph’s critical question.

Although the external threat and the resulting perceived long term emergency to the nation were important and necessary conditions before each draft enactment, these alone were not sufficient. These threats “opened” a policy window to allow political actors—presidents, members of Congress, the military, influential citizens and lobbying groups—the opportunity to advocate and enact a draft. Perhaps due to the nature of the U.S. political system with its pluralistic society and the multiple points of access provided by our government’s separation of powers, it should not be a surprise that each draft period had a different dominant actor. During these draft periods, the actors saw volunteering as a policy that was unable to meet the nation’s manpower needs. For the protracted conflicts and wars in America’s history, only conscription was able to supply the necessary forces. The use of conscription also spurred volunteer enlistments during every draft period.

Given the success of these different actors in the nation’s past, the current security environment, and the continued threat from global terrorism, one cannot definitively state that the draft is no longer a viable manpower solution for the United States. In fact, we may now be in the midst of a draft policy window for the fifth time in our nation’s history and just do not realize it as of yet. Given the unique demands of the global war on terrorism, a volunteer national service program that calls for military or civilian service is needed, even though the current political climate appears to offer little chance of enactment and acceptance. A volunteer national service program could consist of four types of service: the military, AmeriCorps (taking care of the elderly, tutoring disadvantaged children), homeland security (serving as custom agents, guarding ports, or border patrols), and the Peace Corps. And should the response to this appeal to patriotism and volunteerism be limited, then politicians and military leaders would have a real crisis on their hands that they then could use to justify a mandatory universal service program. What is urgently needed now is a public discussion on the necessity for a national service program and/or a return to a draft.

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## INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

*Les lois sur le recrutement sont des institutions* (the laws governing recruitment are [political] institutions).

Marshal Gouvion Saint-Cyr<sup>1</sup>

It may be laid down as a primary position, and the basis of our system, that every Citizen who enjoys the protection of a free Government, owes not only a proportion of his property, but even of his personal services to the defence of it.

George Washington<sup>2</sup>

What kind of society excuses its most privileged members from defending it?

Charles C. Moskos<sup>3</sup>

Nearly everyone has seen the recruiting poster with Uncle Sam pointing directly at you and declaring “I Want You!” This broad patriotic appeal touches upon some very fundamental questions: Who serves in the military (i.e., everyone or only certain individuals, volunteers or conscripts)? What are the obligations of a citizen to the state? Which has a higher priority among the democratic values of liberalism and egalitarianism? The answers to these questions provide insights to how our nation decides to man its armed forces. The military historian, Russell Weigley, wrote: “The historic preoccupation of the Army’s thought in peacetime has been the manpower question: how, in an unmilitary nation, to muster adequate numbers of capable soldiers quickly should war occur.”<sup>4</sup> He further observed that military manpower issues “are by no means new, but rather one gauge of their intractability is that they have persisted unresolved through the whole history of the United States.”<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Quoted in Eliot A. Cohen, *Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 5 and 20.

<sup>2</sup> See George Washington’s “Sentiments on a Peace Establishment,” 1783 in John O’Sullivan and Alan M. Meckler, ed., *The Draft and Its Enemies* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974), 27.

<sup>3</sup> Quoted in Jeffrey Record, “Equal Obligation versus Equal Opportunity: The Case for Conscription,” in *The Anthropic Factor in Warfare: Conscripts, Volunteers, and Reserves* (Washington, D.C: National Defense University, 1988), 225.

<sup>4</sup> George Q. Flynn, *The Draft, 1940-1973* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 1.

<sup>5</sup> O’Sullivan and Meckler, xx.

There currently appears to be a widespread general consensus among politicians, military leaders and academics that the military draft is no longer a viable policy option for the United States in the twenty-first century. President George Bush has stated on several occasions: "We're not going to have a draft, period." "An all-volunteer army is best suited to fight the new wars of the 21<sup>st</sup> century; we don't need mass armies anymore."<sup>6</sup> "Forget all this talk about a draft. We're not going to have a draft so long as I'm the president."<sup>7</sup> Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld echoes his commander-in-chief: "The truth is, we do not need a draft. We're not going to have a draft."<sup>8</sup> "The United States cannot use 20<sup>th</sup> century thinking to fight in the 21<sup>st</sup> century."<sup>9</sup> Secretary of the Army Francis Harvey stated, "The all-volunteer force has proven its value...The 'D' word is the farthest thing from my thoughts."<sup>10</sup> Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker does not foresee a circumstance under which resumption of the draft might be needed to satisfy the global demands placed on the U.S. military.<sup>11</sup> And on Capitol Hill, Senator Fritz Hollings (D-SC), sponsor of the recent Senate draft bill, believed that the only chance his legislation had of passage was if all members of Congress decided not to run for reelection. Representative Charles Rangel (D-NY), sponsor of the defeated House version, even voted against his own bill.<sup>12</sup>

In the foreword of a recently published book assessing thirty years of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF), Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld wrote: "This concept of an all-volunteer force has

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<sup>6</sup> Rowland Nethaway, "Can't Rule Out The Draft," *Waco Tribune-Herald*, 3 November 2004. Accessed at <http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/s20041104334842.html>.

<sup>7</sup> Daniel Schorr, "Assurances Aside, Some Feel Like A Draft," *Christian Science Monitor*, 15 October 2004. Accessed at <http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/s20041015329289.html>.

<sup>8</sup> Thomas E. Ricks, "Small Minority Says Draft Could Happen," *Washington Post*, 27 October 2004, 3. Accessed at <http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e200410273245.html>.

<sup>9</sup> U.S. Department of Defense *Talking Points* – Aug. 10, 2004 – Sec Def Interviews on the Draft published by the U.S. department of Defense Office of Public Affairs.

<sup>10</sup> Dogen Hannah, "Army faces recruiting woes," *Kansas City Star*, 24 March 2005, A5.

<sup>11</sup> Thomas E. Ricks, "Army Chief Sees No Need For Draft," *Washington Post*, 27 July 2004, 2. Accessed at <http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20040727306451.html>.

<sup>12</sup> Telephone interview with Mr. Brooks Haselden on Senator Holling's staff on 15 September 2004 and Carl Hulse, "Bill to Restore the Draft Is Defeated in the House," *The New York Times*, 6 October 2004, A13.

been a booming success. It works and it works well.”<sup>13</sup> But how well is the AVF really working? The viability of the AVF in the current security environment can be questioned for at least eight reasons: unrepresentative of society, lower enlistment propensity to serve, higher cost per recruit, lower quality of recruit, missing recruiting goals, high attrition rate, increased personnel costs, and manning policies, such as stop-loss.

First, and probably the most important reason, is that the U.S. military is less representative of American society. Military service is not shared equally across all segments of society. This disparity is one of class, not race as most people mistakenly believe. As the title of a recent opinion piece in the *Army Times* alludes to, “The children of privileged Americans miss out by not serving in the military.”<sup>14</sup> There are too few enlistees that come from the ranks of the best educated and most well-off. Among 18 to 24 year olds, only six percent of military enlistees (in both the active force and Reserves) have some college experience compared to 46 percent of their counterparts in the civilian population. And a 1998 Department of Defense report concluded that military enlistees come disproportionately from “families in the lower three-quarters of the status distribution.” College graduates and people from the upper-middle and upper classes of American society are significantly underrepresented in today’s military.<sup>15</sup> Currently, only one percent of those serving in Congress have a child serving in the military.<sup>16</sup> The privileged are basically absent from serving in the military. When the military does not fully represent American society, it faces a growing isolation between itself and the political and financial leaders of our country.

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<sup>13</sup> Barbara A. Bickler, Curtis L. Gilroy, and John T. Warner, ed., *THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE: THIRTY YEARS OF SERVICE* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s Inc., 2004), ix.

<sup>14</sup> Kathryn Roth-Douquet, “The children of privileged Americans miss out by not serving in the military,” *Army Times*, 21 February 2005, 46.

<sup>15</sup> Marc Magee and Steven J. Nilder, *Citizen Soldiers and the War on Terror*, Progressive Policy Institute Policy Report (December 2002), 4 (DOD Report) and 6.

<sup>16</sup> Roth-Douquet, 46. Fewer than one-third of the 535 members of Congress have served in the military compared with more than three-quarters in 1977 (see Andrea Stone, For A Few In Congress, War Is Family Concern,” *USA Today*, 6 December 2004, 4).

Second, the enlistment propensity to serve for 16 to 21 year old men reveals a troubling trend. Between 1980 and 2000, surveys showed that the number of young men saying that they would “definitely not serve” in the military rose from 40 to 64 percent. And those reporting “definitely” or “probably” interested in military service is down to approximately 25 percent compared to more than 30 percent in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The main reason this change of attitude did not affect military recruiting was because this decreased interest coincided with the massive post-Cold War drawdown in personnel.<sup>17</sup> Fewer recruits were needed for a smaller military.

The next four reasons all concern recruiting under the AVF. The cost per recruit has more than doubled since 1985 and has increased from slightly over \$8,000 in 1994, \$14,206 in 2003, and \$15,967 in 2004.<sup>18</sup> Additionally, the quality of new recruits has declined while the nation pays more to recruit them. Not only do they have less college experience as their civilian counterparts as discussed above, the number of recruits scoring in the top half of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) has decreased by a third since the mid 1990s. Only 90 percent of new recruits must be high school graduates now compared to 92 percent last year.<sup>19</sup> Given the war on terror and protracted military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, five of the six military Reserve components failed to meet their recruiting goals for the first four months of the current

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<sup>17</sup> Numbers are from Charles Moskos and Paul Glastris, “Now Do You Believe We Need a Draft?” *The Washington Monthly* (November 2001): 10 and Dr. Curtis L. Gilroy, *The All-Volunteer Force and Accession Policy*, PowerPoint brief, dated 16 September 2004, slide 22.

<sup>18</sup> Marc Magee and Steven J. Nider, *Uncle Sam Wants You! ... For 18 Months*, Progressive Policy Institute Policy Brief (March 2003), 3; Ann Scott Tyson, “Uncle Sam Wants You--Please,” *The Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, 28 February – 6 March 2005, 29; and Dr. Gilroy email dated 10 February 2005. The cost-per-recruit is calculated by dividing a Service’s total number of accessions into the total expenditures for enlisted recruiting. These resources are made up of recruiting personnel compensation, enlistment bonuses, college funds, advertising, communications, recruiting support (vehicles, equipment, computers, supplies and applicants’ transportation, food and lodging, etc.), and other appropriations resources within the recruiting command/Service (i.e., other procurement and RDT&E).

<sup>19</sup> Magee and Nider, “Citizen Soldiers,” 6 and Lawrence J. Korb, “All-Volunteer Army Shows Signs of Wear,” *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, 27 February 2005, accessed at <http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20050301354849html>.

fiscal year.<sup>20</sup> The Chief of the Army Reserve, LTG James Helmly publicly warned his superiors in December that the Reserve was “rapidly degenerating into a broken force.”<sup>21</sup> The Marines also missed their recruiting goal in January for the first time in more than a decade, missed it again in February, and are for the first time offering reenlistment bonuses averaging \$20,000 to its most junior infantrymen rather than relying on fresh recruits from basic training. General Richard Cody, the Army Vice Chief of Staff, recently told the House Armed Services Military Personnel Subcommittee that although the active Army is behind on its recruiting quotas (it missed its February goal—the first monthly shortfall since May 2000), it hopes to make year-end goals. As the military increases education incentives (more than \$70,000), raises enlistment bonuses (up to \$20,000) and significantly increases the number of recruiters (the Guard has added 1,400 recruiters, the Reserve has added 800, and the Regular Army and Marines are adding 800 and 425 recruiters, respectively) in an attempt to meet recruiting goals, these increases will also significantly raise the cost per recruit.<sup>22</sup> Finally, after all this effort to recruit this military volunteer, roughly one third of them fail to complete their first term enlistment.<sup>23</sup> The General Accounting Office estimated that this high attrition rate of first termers costs the military more than \$1,300,000,000 each year.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Only the Marine Corps Reserve had achieved their recruiting quotas through January 2005.

<sup>21</sup> Bradley, Graham, “General Says Army Reserve Is Becoming A ‘Broken’ Force,” *Washington Post*, 6 January 2005, 1.

<sup>22</sup> These reported strains on the military come from a variety of sources: Dr. Gilroy’s power point brief (slide 13); MOAA’s *Legislative Update* dated 4 February 2005; Richard Whittle, “Army says it’ll meet recruitment target,” *Dallas Morning News*, 3 February 2005, 19A; Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “Rumsfeld and Army Want to Delay Decision on Larger Force,” *The New York Times*, 9 February 2005, A21; Eric Schmitt, “Units of Military Reserve Miss Recruiting Goals,” *The New York Times*, 17 February 2005; “Rebuilding the Army,” *The Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, 14-20 February 2005, 25; Eric Schmitt, “For the Few and the Proud, Concern Over the ‘Few’ Part,” *The New York Times*, 25 February 2005, A12; Jane McHugh, “Regular Army falls short of recruiting goal,” *The Army Times*, 14 March 2005, 10; and Tyson, “Uncle Sam Wants You-Please.”

<sup>23</sup> Dr. Gilroy email message to author, dated 10 February 2005. Contrast this one third dropout rate with only one in ten draftees who did not complete their two-year obligation during the Cold War (Moskos and Glastris, 10).

<sup>24</sup> Magee and Nider, “Citizen Soldiers,” 11.

The seventh reason concerns the compensation system of the AVF, particularly the increased costs and the compression of the enlisted pay scale. The per capita cost of a single active duty service member in 1964 (the last year of the draft before Vietnam) was \$29,140 per year (in constant 1999 dollars). In 1999, the cost had risen to \$63,812. Charles Moskos, the noted military sociologist, wrote “the bottom line is that it costs over twice as much to maintain a person in uniform in the all-volunteer force than it did during the days of conscription.”<sup>25</sup> Additionally, in order to make basic pay more attractive to volunteers and make it more comparable to the civilian sector, a junior enlisted person makes almost half of a very senior noncommissioned officer. During the draft, the compensation ratio of a master sergeant to a private was seven to one. Moskos argued that “this compression of the pay scale is one of the most significant developments of the all-volunteer force, though not usually commented upon.”<sup>26</sup>

The eighth reason that indicates all is not well with the AVF is the ongoing Department of Defense policies to ensure adequate manpower to fight the war on terrorism. Stop-loss, what some call a “backdoor draft” as the government kept the entire U.S. Marine Corps (174,312 members) on active duty for an extra 12 months and currently keeps 40,000 soldiers beyond their agreed upon enlistment time, involuntary call ups of more than 6,000 people from the Individual Ready Reserve, and allowing retirees to return to active duty are just a few examples.<sup>27</sup> Without these policies, the actual shortfalls in recruiting discussed above would be even greater. Clearly, the current pace of Guard and Reserve deployments is not sustainable for the long term. David Segal, a military sociologist, argues that just as the unpopular draft “was a casualty of the

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<sup>25</sup> Charles Moskos, “What Ails the All-Volunteer Force: An Institutional Perspective,” *Parameters* (Summer 2001): 33. The per capita total includes direct manpower costs, family housing, and personnel support.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid. In 2000, regular military compensation—basic pay plus allowances for subsistence and housing—was \$23,666 for a private. For a master sergeant with 26 years of service, military compensation was \$56,868.

<sup>27</sup> Korb, “All-Volunteer Army” and the statistic on the Marines is from Mark Shields, “Rumsfeld’s Draft Dodge,” *Washington Post*, 18 January 2003, A23.

Vietnam War...the Reserve and Guard will be a casualty of Operation Iraqi Freedom.”<sup>28</sup> Some state governors and Guard members and their families are beginning to question the Guard’s deployment, leaving states unprepared for natural disasters and homeland defense.<sup>29</sup>

Despite this general consensus against the draft and given the questionable viability of the AVF, this monograph explores the critical question: Is a military draft still a viable manpower policy for the United States? After presenting the methodology and defining key terms in the next section, a detailed analysis of the four major draft enactments/periods in U.S. history: Civil War, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War will show that the factors that resulted in a military draft in our nation’s past are just as relevant in the twenty-first century. A brief discussion on the adoption of the AVF and recent legislative efforts to return to a military draft or creation of a national service program provide additional insights to answering the monograph’s critical question. Given the current security environment, a military draft is still a viable policy option as the United States fights the global war on terrorism (GWOT). Given the unique demands of the GWOT, a volunteer national service program that calls for military or civilian service is needed, even though the current political climate appears to offer little chance of enactment and acceptance.

## METHODOLOGY

Greater than the tread of mighty armies is an idea whose time has come.

Victor Hugo<sup>30</sup>

The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of

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<sup>28</sup> Dave Moniz, “Guardsmen, Reservists Hit Hard At Home By Call-Ups,” USA Today, 7 February 2005, 1. Accessed at <http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20050207350424.html>.

<sup>29</sup> “Governor Wants Guard Troops Back For Fires,” *Los Angeles Times*, 5 March 2005, accessed at <http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20050305355696.html> and Al Neuharth, “Guard’s ‘Draft’ duty In Iraq Is Backfiring,” USA Today, 11 March 2005, 13, accessed at <http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20050311356926.html>.

<sup>30</sup> Quoted in John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1984), 1.

probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of government alone.

Carl von Clausewitz<sup>31</sup>

In four instances, representing 35 years of our nation's history, the time had come when a military draft was the nation's manpower policy, allowing for the formation of mighty armies to defend America and fight her wars.<sup>32</sup> This monograph combines two existing models of analysis to create a unique framework to analyze the politics surrounding the four major draft periods mentioned above as well as for the contemporary period. The first model is Professor John Kingdon's revision of the garbage can theory of organizational choice, which used problem recognition, policy proposals, and politics "streams."<sup>33</sup> The second model is Carl von Clausewitz' "paradoxical trinity," which consisted of "primordial violence, hatred, and enmity" (the people); "of the play of chance and probability" (the commander and his army); and "reason" (the government).<sup>34</sup>

In his classic book, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, Kingdon explored the rise and fall of domestic health and transportation policy issues on the government's agenda. There are all sorts of problems that require solutions and policy proposals seeking implementation. The political stream is the environment where the interaction of problems, policy proposals, and actors occurs. He defined a policy window as "an opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special problems."<sup>35</sup>

Using this model, the fundamental problem that this monograph addresses is how the United States obtains the personnel needed to man its armed forces. There are three main policies/proposals: the AVF, conscription (used interchangeably with military draft), and national

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<sup>31</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edit. and trans Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.

<sup>32</sup> The 35 years of conscription represents two years during the Civil War (1863-1865), one year during World War I (1917-1918), five years during World War II (1940-1945), and twenty-seven years during the Cold War (1945-1947 and 1948-1973).

<sup>33</sup> Kingdon, 91-94.

service. The following definitions will ensure all have a common understanding of what distinguishes these three policies:

**All-Volunteer Force**--people who of his or her own free will offers themselves for military service.

**Conscription or draft**--compulsory enrollment for service in our nation's armed forces.

**National Service**--currently defined as "a way of strengthening the civic ideals of public service and community spirit through **voluntary** participation in activities designed to meet social needs" (emphasis added).<sup>36</sup>

Of course, if national service became mandatory, it would no longer be voluntary and could even be called universal service where all of an eligible population would be required to serve.

Selective service is when the nation selects men for military service on the basis of an overall usefulness to a total (i.e., economic and military) war effort. Hence, selective and universal service are both forms of conscription, but differ with respect to who is required to serve.<sup>37</sup>

Finally, the four historical periods being examined correspond to 'policy windows' where, as a result of the political interaction of various actors, the military draft was accepted as a solution to the nation's military manpower requirements.

Critical to understanding why the draft was adopted when it was during these four policy windows and what actor was dominant in each passage, this monograph also uses Clausewitz' "paradoxical trinity." He described it:

As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone. The first of these

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<sup>34</sup> Clausewitz, 89.

<sup>35</sup> Kingdon, 173.

<sup>36</sup> Definitions are drawn from several sources: Cohen's book (23); *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (92); and "National Service," *Congressional Digest* (May 1990): 131.

<sup>37</sup> Richard V.L. Cooper, "AVF vs. DRAFT: Where Do We Go from Here?" in William J. Taylor, Jr., Eric T. Olson and Richard A. Schrader, ed., *Defense Manpower Planning: Issues for the 1980s* (New York: Pergamon Press, Inc, 1981), 93.

three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government.<sup>38</sup>

Since Clausewitz wrote about a monarchy and the United States is a democratic republic, his notion of the government is expanded to include the president, members of Congress, and the courts. Using this updated trinity of the American people, military leaders, and governmental actors, and examining their interaction in the political environment during each draft enactment period, allows us to explore the relationship between the citizen and the state and how our government has manned its armed forces. Gaining these insights will help to determine if a military draft is still a viable policy for the twenty-first century.

## THE DRAFT IN U.S. HISTORY

The only thing new in the world is the history you don't know.

President Harry S. Truman<sup>39</sup>

As soon as public service ceases to be the main business of the citizens, and they prefer to serve with their pocketbooks rather than with their persons, the State is already close to ruin.

Jean Jacques Rousseau<sup>40</sup>

In order to understand the viability of the draft today, it is necessary to examine the four previous periods when the nation resorted to a draft: Civil War, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. For each period, the analysis will answer four questions: How did the draft come about, i.e., what were the politics of its passage? Who were the dominant actors in its passage? Who served? and What was the impact or results of the draft? Traditionally, the nation has relied on volunteers and state militia, but in the mid-nineteenth century, what the poet Walt Whitman

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<sup>38</sup> Clausewitz, 89.

<sup>39</sup> John Bartlett, *Bartlett's Familiar Quotations*, 17<sup>th</sup> Edition (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 2002), 705.

<sup>40</sup> Quoted in Record, 225.

called that “strange sad war” saw both the North and the South resort to conscription to field their armies.<sup>41</sup>

## The Civil War

The Civil War was indeed both strange and sad. Strange in that it represented what many believe was the first modern war--a total war with unlimited objectives fought with massed armies with new technologies--and sad in that it was a war of conflicting ideals between a nation divided with brothers fighting their brothers. After the initial optimism had faded that the war would be short, both the Confederate and Union governments realized that they needed large masses of men if they had any hopes of winning. The traditional methods of relying on organized militia, volunteers, and the small regular Army were not nearly enough to provide the required manpower.

In the spring of 1862, the Confederates faced a growing manpower crisis as the terms of their 12-month men were expiring and few were willing to reenlist. General Robert E. Lee recommended to President Jefferson Davis that a conscription bill be enacted. On April 16, 1862, the Confederate Congress enacted the first national draft law passed by an American legislative body by a vote of more than two to one. The law provided that all white males between the ages of 18 and 35 were liable for military service for three years. Later in the war, Congress extended the age limits from 17 to 50.<sup>42</sup> The draft only raised about one-third of the Confederacy’s military power.<sup>43</sup> Several problems weakened the draft’s ability to raise more soldiers. First, the law provided numerous exemptions not only to certain vital productive services, but also to druggists, teachers, editors, printers, and one white man on each plantation with 20 or more slaves. Second,

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<sup>41</sup> *Life History of the United States* (London: Time, Inc., 1973), 759.

<sup>42</sup> John O’Sullivan and Alan M. Meckler, ed., *The Draft and Its Enemies* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974), 61.

<sup>43</sup> Robert K. Griffith, Jr., “To Raise and Support Armies: The Evolution of US Military Manpower Systems,” in *The Anthropo Factor in Warfare: Conscripts, Volunteers, and Reserves* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1988), 19.

the law allowed any draftee to avoid service by hiring a substitute or by paying the government a cash commutation fee.<sup>44</sup> Third, the irony of fighting for freedom and states' rights, but requiring individuals to serve under central authority was not lost on several Southern governors. Governor Joseph E. Brown of Georgia called the law "a palpable assault upon the rights and sovereignty of the State" and listed 15,000 persons as indispensable state officials who were not liable to the draft.<sup>45</sup>

In 1862, the Union also confronted similar manpower shortages. The Militia Act of 1862 had a clause that provided President Abraham Lincoln with the authority to draft manpower from the states which did not meet their quota of volunteers, representing the first time in the history of the United States that the Federal Government assumed military conscription power. However, the draft of 1862 never went into effect, as this threat of conscription had the effect of spurring enlistments by volunteers.<sup>46</sup>

In early 1863, after the battles of Antietam and Fredicksburg with heavy Union losses, victory seemed no closer. On March 3 after two weeks of debate, Congress passed by comfortable majorities the Enrollment Act of 1863 (also known as the Conscription Act).<sup>47</sup> Under the constitutional clause permitting the government "to raise and support armies," the Act imposed a draft liability on all male citizens between the ages of 20 and 45 years for three years or the war, whichever ended first. Like the Confederate conscription law, this Act permitted substitution and commutation, whereby a draftee could purchase exemption for \$300. Congress included the commutation provision at the urging of Northern manufacturers who feared a draft

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<sup>44</sup> *Life History of the United States*, 761.

<sup>45</sup> O'Sullivan and Meckler, 56.

<sup>46</sup> Russell F. Weigley, *History of the United States Army* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1967), 208.

<sup>47</sup> Allan R. Millett & Peter Maslowski, *For The Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America*, Revised and Expanded (New York: The Free Press, 1984/1994), 207 and U.S. Department of the Army, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945*, by LTC Marvin A. Kreidberg and 1LT Merton G. Henry, Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-212, (Washington, D.C.:U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), 104. Hereafter cited as Kreidberg.

would strip their factories of skilled laborers.<sup>48</sup> This Act did not allow the occupational exemptions that Southerners used to their benefit, but still more than 50 percent of Northern draftees found an exemption, usually with a physical disability.<sup>49</sup> Although President Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin Stanton took part in the drafting of this Act and supported it, they never endorsed it publicly. Fearing negative public reaction, they wanted the legislation to arise in Congress and appear grass roots oriented.<sup>50</sup>

Opposition to the draft was more intense in the North. Slogans such as “A rich man’s war and a poor man’s fight”<sup>51</sup> and “The rich man’s money against the poor man’s blood”<sup>52</sup> were common. At the first national draft lottery in New York City in July 1863, protesters started “the bloodiest civil riot in American history” that lasted four days with an estimated 1,000 casualties and \$1,500,000 in damages.<sup>53</sup> Northerners widely resented the draft—those poor men who could not buy their way out, recent immigrants who had experienced compulsory service in their native countries, as well as people who did want to fight to emancipate blacks.<sup>54</sup>

Of the approximately 2,670,000 men raised by the North, the direct effect of the draft can account for only six percent of this total.<sup>55</sup> The draft’s major purpose was to spur enlistments by threatening conscription. Volunteers received large bounties and veterans received reenlistment bonuses. States expended huge sums on bounties. For example, Illinois spent \$13,711,389 and New York spent more than \$86,000,000. The total bounty expenditures by the Union was \$750,000,000.<sup>56</sup> The principal importance of the Enrollment Act of 1863 was that “this measure established firmly the principle that every citizen owes the Nation the obligation to defend it and

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<sup>48</sup> Griffith, “To Raise and Support Armies,” 18.

<sup>49</sup> Millett & Maslowski, 207.

<sup>50</sup> Gus C. Lee and Geoffrey Y. Parker, *Ending the Draft: The Story of the All Volunteer Force* (Alexandria: Human Resources Research Organization, 1977), 7-8.

<sup>51</sup> Cohen, 145.

<sup>52</sup> Lee and Parker, 8.

<sup>53</sup> Quotation from Record, 230 and Kreidberg, 106.

<sup>54</sup> *Life History of the United States*, 762.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., 108.

<sup>56</sup> O’Sullivan and Meckler, 58.

that the Federal Government can impose that obligation directly on the citizen without mediation of the states.”<sup>57</sup> Due to the reality of an extended conflict that required tremendous manpower numbers on both sides of the Mason-Dixon Line, Congress was the dominant actor that passed the conscription legislation.

The Civil War marked the last major conflict that the nation would depend on both organized militia and volunteers. Professor Weigley summarized his perspective on the war’s manpower policies:

After reviewing the problems and anomalies of the effort to maintain the volunteer armies of the 1860’s, the United States would never again attempt to raise a mass wartime army by that method. Federal conscription would be the principal legacy of the Civil War experience to future American war armies.<sup>58</sup>

Additionally, an after action report by Brevet Brigadier General James Oakes, assistant provost marshal general who administered the draft laws in Illinois, wrote a detailed report that recommended that “it be the citizen’s responsibility to register in future drafts; that substitution, commutation, and bounties be rejected forever; and that the central government take over full responsibility for the draft rather than depend on the states for help.” This report would play a significant role in shaping the draft during World War I when his recommendations were implemented.<sup>59</sup>

## **World War I**

While the Great War raged across Europe, Americans were torn between watchful waiting and willing participation. In his State of the Union message to Congress on December 8, 1914, President Woodrow Wilson called for America’s distance from the European war and believed that volunteers would be sufficient to meet the nation’s military needs. The President was personally predisposed against using coercion. Members of Congress stood cheering when

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<sup>57</sup> Kreidberg, 108.

<sup>58</sup> Weigley, “History,” 216.

<sup>59</sup> O’Sullivan and Meckler, 60.

Wilson finished his address.<sup>60</sup> Slightly two years later, Congress passed the Selective Service Act of 1917 by overwhelming majorities. In order to understand this shift, it is necessary to examine the pivotal actions of members of the Preparedness Movement, a broad coalition of critics, in and out of uniform, who believed that the United States was unready for war with a first-class power and advocated compulsory military training.<sup>61</sup>

In early 1915, the Preparedness Movement gained momentum, especially under the direction of former President Theodore Roosevelt and former Army Chief of Staff Major General Leonard Wood. The American Rights Committee, the National Security League, the Army League, and the National Association for Universal Military Training were some of the influential interest groups of this movement.<sup>62</sup> General Wood was the guiding spirit of the Plattsburg movement, which was a voluntary military training program that many prominent business and professional men attended.<sup>63</sup> He argued that “national preparedness means...first of all, the moral organization of the people, an organization which creates in the heart of every citizen a sense of his obligation for service to the nation in time of war.”<sup>64</sup> General Wood certainly did not think volunteerism was the solution:

The voluntary system failed us in the past, and will fail us in the future. It is uncertain in operation, prevents organized preparation, tends to destroy that individual sense of obligation for military service which should be found in every citizen, costs excessively in life and treasure, and does not permit that condition of preparedness which must exist if we are to wage war successfully with any great power prepared for war.<sup>65</sup>

The major push for conscription came from the Army’s General Staff and its War College Division. In November 1915, the Secretary of War Lindley Garrison forbade consideration of the

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid., 103.

<sup>61</sup> Griffith, “To Raise and Support Armies,” 21

<sup>62</sup> O’Sullivan and Meckler, 103-104 and Weigley, “History,” 342-343.

<sup>63</sup> O’Sullivan and Meckler, 104.

<sup>64</sup> Weigley, “History,” 342.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 343.

topic when he learned that a General Staff captain was circulating a memorandum advocating compulsory military service.<sup>66</sup>

Major General Hugh L. Scott, Army Chief of Staff, and Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, who succeeded Garrison in March 1916, were the two dominant players who would change the President's position on conscription, guide its passage through Congress, and ensure its effective implementation. In hearings before the House Military Affairs Committee on January 10, 1916, General Scott advocated compulsory military service, but emphasized that "I can speak only for myself."<sup>67</sup> His avocation, which was contrary to the President and Secretary of War's positions, was a bold public stand for the senior military man at the time. In his annual report, dated September 30, 1916, General Scott urged that the "volunteer system in this country...be relegated to the past."<sup>68</sup> And in testimony before a Senate Committee on December 19, he again argued that "the time has come when this country must resort to universal liability to military training and service."<sup>69</sup> That same month, General Scott directed the War College Division to prepare a study of a system of training and universal service to form the basis of legislation. General Scott approved this study, called the National Army Plan, on February 14, 1917 and Secretary Baker submitted it to Congress on February 23. This study, although a long-range study, served a useful educational purpose as well as the basis for the Selective Service Act.<sup>70</sup>

After the war, Secretary Baker described the manner in which he and the President became proponents of conscription. He wrote:

After the suspension of diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany [on 3 February 1917], **General Scott**, discussing with me the possibility of our entrance into the war, raised the question of the method by which men should be called into service. He told me that, in his own view, there should be a draft law at the very outset and that we should avoid the British experience of starting out with the volunteer system and being later

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<sup>66</sup> Kreidberg, 201-202.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., 242.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., 236-237 and 242-243.

**obliged to come to the draft.** In this discussion I became convinced of the soundness of the suggestion and at once laid it before the President, who discussed it with me earnestly and at length and in the end, approved the suggestion saying, “Have the law drawn at once so that, if I should be obliged to go to the Congress, I can refer to it in my message as a law ready to be presented for their consideration” (emphasis added).<sup>71</sup>

This passage illustrates that President Wilson made the decision to conscript America before he called on Congress to declare war and more than two months before Congress passed the Act that legalized the draft. By closely held agreement, the President, Secretary of War, and Major General Enoch Crowder, Judge Advocate General of the Army, organized “the colossal machinery for enforcing the draft...long before the country knew there would be a draft—while, indeed, the country continued to take it for granted that only the volunteer system would be used.”<sup>72</sup>

President Wilson accepted wartime conscription for two major reasons. First, he recognized the efficiency and equity of the draft over the chaos of the volunteer system. Second, he knew that by opting for conscription, he could block one of his leading critics, former president Theodore Roosevelt, who wanted to raise a volunteer force and lead it in France.<sup>73</sup> Now with the President’s support, General Crowder drafted the legislation along with Secretary Baker, Major General Scott, Major General Tasker Bliss, and Brigadier General Joseph Kuhn during a series of conferences. After German U-boats sank three American merchant ships without warning in March 1917 and the publication of the Zimmerman note, which encouraged Mexico to invade the United States, President Wilson summoned Congress into a special session on April 2 and Congress responded by declaring war on Germany on April 6. The following day, the draft bill was submitted to Congress with President Wilson’s endorsement for “men, who should, in my opinion be chosen upon the principle of universal liability to service.”<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 243.

<sup>72</sup> Sullivan, 27.

<sup>73</sup> Griffith, “To Raise and Support Armies,” 22.

<sup>74</sup> Kreidberg, 243.

Both houses of Congress engaged in heated debate over the draft legislation for over a month. Opponents of the draft had harsh words: “Prussianize America;” “destroy democracy at home while fighting it abroad;” abject or involuntary servitude;” “un-American;” “rioting all over the United States will add more joy to the German heart;” and “the streets of our American cities running red with blood on Registration Day.”<sup>75</sup> Speaker of the House Champ Clark (D-Mo.) stated that he saw “precious little difference between a conscript and a convict.”<sup>76</sup> Senators in favor of selective service argued that “volunteering is haphazard, inefficient, disruptive of industrial and economic stability, wasteful, and operatively unequal in spreading the obligations of citizenship” while “conscription is the fairest, most democratic, most efficient and most patriotic method of raising an army.”<sup>77</sup>

When the time for the vote came however on April 28, only eight senators and twenty-four representatives voted in opposition.<sup>78</sup> Perhaps reflecting a barometer of the American public’s feelings on the draft, the results of a survey of American newspapers and mayors by a Preparedness interest group, the National Security League, may indicate why overwhelming majorities in both houses supported its passage. Of the League’s survey of 857 newspapers, 542 papers favored compulsory service, 253 were noncommittal, and only 63 were in opposition. Of their survey of 379 mayors, 200 favored selective service, 144 were indifferent, and only 35 were against it.<sup>79</sup> President Wilson signed the bill unto law on May 18 and set registration day for June 5.<sup>80</sup> At local draft boards across the country, more than 9,500,000 men, in the draft’s age range of

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<sup>75</sup> Mark Sullivan, “Conscription,” in Martin Anderson and Barbara Honegger, ed., *The Military Draft: Selected Readings on Conscription* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), 29.

<sup>76</sup> O’Sullivan and Meckler, 105.

<sup>77</sup> Charles William Pike, “A Comparative Analysis: Will the All-Volunteer Force or a Universal Military Training and Service Program Offer the Best Means of Assuring National Defense for the United States in the 1980s?” (Ph.D. diss., Lehigh University, 1983), 36.

<sup>78</sup> O’Sullivan and Meckler, 122-123.

<sup>79</sup> Joseph Ronald Fernandez, “Conscription in the Civil War and World War I: The Rejection and Acceptance of Authority” (Ph.D. diss., University of Connecticut, 1976), 212.

<sup>80</sup> The registration occurred only two weeks after the President’s signing because of the extensive secret advanced preparations taken by Secretary Baker to ensure that the draft machinery could start the day Congress passed the law. See Sullivan, 28.

21 to 30, came forward to sign up. President Wilson stated, “It is in no sense a conscription of the unwilling; it is rather, selection from a nation which has volunteered in mass.”<sup>81</sup> However, it was not entirely in mass as more than 300,000 men evaded the call to service.<sup>82</sup>

America’s use of selective service provided a model for the intelligent use of manpower in wartime. The draft supplied 67 percent of the manpower needed for the war.<sup>83</sup> On registration day, President Wilson told his fellow Americans that while “the nation needs all men,” it needs them where they “will best serve the common good...The whole nation must be a team in which each man shall play the part for which he is best fitted.”<sup>84</sup> Echoing his Commander-in-Chief, General Crowder stressed that “the ultimate goal of America was to organize not only an army, but a nation for war...Every man within the draft age had to become either an effective producer or a soldier.”<sup>85</sup> Economic mobilization was just as important as military mobilization. Automotive executive Howard E. Coffin emphasized: “Twentieth century warfare demands that the blood of the soldier must be mingled with from three to five parts of the sweat of the man in the factories, mills, mines, and fields of the nation of arms.”<sup>86</sup> Although three million men were called to service in 1917, approximately one million were found physically unfit and another million received exemptions for dependency, alien status, critical occupations, and religious beliefs. Of the remaining, only a half a million men were called into service by the end of 1917. Allan Millett and Peter Maslowski, military historians, wrote: “As intended, the draft “selected” those men the Army wanted and society could best spare: 90 percent of the draftees were

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<sup>81</sup> O’Sullivan and Meckler, 127-128.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., 105.

<sup>83</sup> Griffith, “To Raise and Support Armies,” 23.

<sup>84</sup> O’Sullivan and Meckler, 128.

<sup>85</sup> Cohen, 83.

<sup>86</sup> Millett & Maslowski, 351.

unmarried, and 70 percent were farm hands or manual hands.”<sup>87</sup> Minor resistance in some farm districts was the only sign of opposition to the draft.<sup>88</sup>

The Selective Service Act of 1917 was strictly a wartime measure; one of its provisions explicitly stated that conscription would end with hostilities. No one was inducted after November 11, 1918. This Act represented a major improvement compared to the Enrollment Act of 1863. The Act of 1917 outlawed the payment of bounties, prohibited substitution and commutation, placed the responsibility for carrying out the conscription functions not in the hands of the military but with local civilian boards, and made it an obligation of citizenship for men to come forward to enroll.<sup>89</sup> The Act also helped the Army and National Guard’s recruiting drives—more than 700,000 volunteers enlisted by the end of 1917 alone.<sup>90</sup> The Supreme Court also unanimously upheld the constitutionality of the Act in a series of cases, collectively called the Selective Draft Law Cases (*Arver et al. v. United States*). This decision has become “the basic statement of the Court on the power of the federal government to conscript military manpower.”<sup>91</sup>

General Crowder, who drafted the legislation, stressed the key to Allied victory: “Just as the war could not have been won without America, so the war could not have been won without the draft.”<sup>92</sup> While “Germany’s to blame”<sup>93</sup> for threatening America with its unrestricted submarine warfare, Generals Scott and Crowder, and later Secretary Baker, share the credit for being the three dominant actors that guided the draft from its inception through its successful

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<sup>87</sup> Ibid., 350.

<sup>88</sup> *Life History of the United States*, 1374.

<sup>89</sup> O’Sullivan and Meckler, 105-106 and Millett & Maslowski, 209. Compared to the military dominated and operated draft of the Civil War, only slightly more than two percent of the people engaged in the administration of the Selective Service Act of 1917 were military personnel (Kreidberg, 253).

<sup>90</sup> Millett & Maslowski, 350.

<sup>91</sup> O’Sullivan and Meckler, 139-140. The justices declared that the draft was a legitimate exercise of Congress’ war making powers as well as its “necessary and proper” powers to raise and support armies. They also rejected the defendants’ argument that compulsory service was in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of involuntary servitude. Chief Justice Edward D. White emphasized the duties of citizenship when he wrote: “It may be doubted that the very conception of a just government and its duty to the citizen includes the reciprocal obligation of the citizen to render military service in case of need and the right to compel it” (Ibid., 142).

<sup>92</sup> Griffith, “To Raise and Support Armies,” 23.

implementation. After the war, Congress considered universal military training, but there was very little popular support for compulsory peacetime military service. The National Defense Act of 1920 reaffirmed America's peacetime reliance on voluntary recruitment. Nothing would really change for almost two decades.<sup>94</sup>

## World War II

There is an old political-science axiom that "Who mobilizes the elites, mobilizes the public."<sup>95</sup> Perhaps no better illustration of this axiom was the efforts of the National Emergency Committee (NEC) of the Military Training Camps Association (MTCA) and their leader, Greenville Clark, a prominent eastern attorney and anglophile. While the White House, War Department, and the Army sat on the sidelines and Germany continued its attack against France and Great Britain, Clark and his organization, in four short months, conceived, wrote, and lobbied the Selective Training and Service Act (STASA) of 1940 through Congress during an election year.<sup>96</sup> Clark is known as the "Father of Selective Service."<sup>97</sup>

On May 8, 1940, a group of private citizens met at the Harvard Club in New York City to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Plattsburg movement and to discuss the worrisome events in Europe. Germany had just conquered Norway and Denmark. Led by Clark, they decided to institute a peacetime draft and strengthen the Army. They would dedicate their energy and substantial resources to secure its passage.<sup>98</sup> Two days after this meeting, Hitler's armies invaded Belgium, Holland, and France. At another New York City meeting on June 3, they decided to create a new organization, the NEC. One of their first priorities was to organize a public relations

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<sup>93</sup> Fernandez, 110.

<sup>94</sup> Lee and Parker, 11.

<sup>95</sup> Garry J. Clifford and Samuel R. Spencer, Jr., *The First Peacetime Draft* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986) 5.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., 4-5 and George Q. Flynn, *Conscription and Democracy: The Draft in France, Great Britain, and the United States* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002), 228-229 and Flynn, "The Draft," 11.

<sup>97</sup> John G. Clifford, "Greenville Clark and the Origins of Selective Service," *Review of Politics* 35 (January 1973): 17.

campaign to educate the public. They hired Perley Boone, a former *New York Times* reporter who had just spent the past four years as the highly successful director of publicity for the New York World's Fair. Boone was one of the best public relations people in the nation; his media campaign brought 26 million people to the fair.<sup>99</sup> Just after the NEC's draft bill was introduced in Congress, its entire text went out to the Associated Press, United Press, and International News Service wires to almost 2,000 newspapers from coast to coast. As a result of Boone's connections with several influential editors, meetings with key officials from the wire services, and his publicity maneuver with the transmission of the entire text, the Burke-Wadsworth bill became a major issue overnight.<sup>100</sup>

President Roosevelt did not want the political liability of supporting a peacetime draft during an election year, especially his own unprecedented third term. Roosevelt shared "doubt as to whether a limited form of selective draft will be popular. In fact, it may very easily defeat the Democratic National ticket."<sup>101</sup> When the Republican presidential nominee, Wendell Willkie stated that "some sort of selective service is the only democratic way in which to secure the competent and trained manpower we need for national defense,"<sup>102</sup> the draft issue was essentially removed as an election issue. It was not until mid-July 1940 when Roosevelt accepted his party's nomination that he publicly announced for the first time that most Americans "are agreed that some form of selection by draft is necessary and fair today as it was in 1917 and 1918."<sup>103</sup> Historians John O'Sullivan and Alan Meckler wrote that "the banner headlines, the bulletins crackling over the airwaves, and the intimidating images flickering on the newsreel screens had

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<sup>98</sup> O'Sullivan and Meckler, 164 and Clifford and Spencer, 14-15.

<sup>99</sup> Clifford and Spencer, 71.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., 87-88.

<sup>101</sup> Quoted in Flynn, "The Draft," 18.

<sup>102</sup> Quoted in O'Sullivan and Meckler, 157.

<sup>103</sup> Quoted in Flynn, "The Draft," 10.

decided the case for conscription.”<sup>104</sup> Although both Roosevelt and Willkie accepted the need for conscription, members of Congress still engaged in nearly three months of debate.

Clark and his group were influential in promoting the appointment of one of their supporters, Henry Stimson as Secretary of War. On June 20, 1940, the President nominated him for that position.<sup>105</sup> Stimson was a member of the World War I Plattsburg movement, a leader in the Republican Party, a staunch internationalist, and a firm supporter of the draft. He personally made it clear to General George Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, that he expected him and the General Staff to support it.<sup>106</sup> Up to this point, General Marshall preferred a more gradual and balanced buildup of the Army based on volunteerism.<sup>107</sup> While Stimson fought for compulsory service within the Administration, the MTCA organized a very effective educational and lobbying campaign to win public support just as Congress began its consideration.<sup>108</sup> Professor George Flynn wrote:

The Clark lobby did yeoman work in selling the draft...With the help of Julius Ochs Adler of the *New York Times*, the lobby spread the word across the country to trade papers, American Legion posts, state legislators, chambers of congress, universities, Rotary clubs, and radio stations. By July 87 percent of the newspaper editors in the nation favored the draft.<sup>109</sup>

In October 1939, a Gallup poll indicated only 37 percent of those questioned supported compulsory military training, but in June 1940, 64 percent were now in favor of it.<sup>110</sup> And a public poll in December 1940 showed that 89 percent thought the draft was a good idea.<sup>111</sup> This shift in public support provides an indication of the effectiveness of the MTCA’s publicity campaign.

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<sup>104</sup> O’Sullivan and Meckler, 158.

<sup>105</sup> Clifford and Spencer, 88-89 and Flynn, “The Draft,” 11.

<sup>106</sup> Kreidberg, 578.

<sup>107</sup> Robert K. Griffith, Jr., “Conscription and the All-Volunteer Army in Historical Perspective” in William J. Taylor, Jr., Eric T. Olson and Richard A. Schrader, ed., *Defense Manpower Planning: Issues for the 1980s* (New York: Pergamon Press, Inc, 1981), 22.

<sup>108</sup> O’Sullivan and Meckler, 157.

<sup>109</sup> Flynn, “The Draft,” 11.

<sup>110</sup> O’Sullivan and Meckler, 157.

<sup>111</sup> Flynn, “The Draft,” 25.

Also on June 20, 1940, Senator Edward Burke (D-Neb.) and Representative James Wadsworth (R-NY) introduced the bill for peacetime selective service in their respective houses of Congress as France was preparing to surrender to Germany the following day at Compiegne. Neither sponsor of the bill had seen the legislation until 48 hours prior to their introducing it.<sup>112</sup> Representative Wadsworth emphasized the temporary nature of selective service when he explained “that this is an emergency measure...It is not an attempt to establish a permanent policy in the United States.”<sup>113</sup> Senator Burton Wheeler (D-Mont.), the Senate’s leading opponent, warned “Enact peacetime conscription and no longer will this be a free land.”<sup>114</sup> At one time, senators’ mail ran 90 percent against the bill. Staunch opposition to conscription came from the peace movement, organized labor, many religious groups, and many educational institutions, although leaders of elite schools supported the bill.<sup>115</sup>

On September 14, Congress passed the STASA by large majorities. In the Senate, the vote was 47 to 25, with 40 Democrats and 7 Republicans voting yes and 13 Democrats, 10 Republicans, 1 Progressive, and 1 Independent voting no. In the House, the vote was 232 to 124, with 186 Democrats and 46 Republicans supporting it, and 32 Democrats, 88 Republicans, 1 American Laborite,<sup>116</sup> 1 Farmer Laborite, and 2 Progressives in opposition. The *Boston Herald* declared the draft as a “triumph of deliberate democratic procedure” and praised the “far-sighted Greenville Clark of New York” as the author of the law.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>112</sup> Clifford and Spencer, 5.

<sup>113</sup> Richard Gillam, “The Peacetime Draft: Voluntarism to Coercion,” in Martin Anderson and Barbara Honegger, ed., *The Military Draft: Selected Readings on Conscription* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), 104.

<sup>114</sup> *Life History of the United States*, 1599

<sup>115</sup> Flynn, “The Draft,” 16.

<sup>116</sup> Clifford and Spencer, 221.

<sup>117</sup> James J. Martin, “Peacetime Registration for Conscription—Forty Years Ago,” *Journal of Historical Review* (Spring 1982): 15.

As the German Luftwaffe bombed London, President Roosevelt signed the bill into law on September 16 and set October 16 as the first registration date.<sup>118</sup> He announced that by adopting the law in peacetime, America “has broadened and enriched our basic concepts of citizenship. Besides the clear and equal opportunities, we have set forth the underlying other duties, obligations and responsibilities of equal service.”<sup>119</sup> After the signing, Stimson wrote Clark a congratulatory note: “I want to tell you what a fine job—in fact unique job—you have done in getting it drafted and passed. If it had not been for you no such bill would have been enacted at this time. Of this I am certain.”<sup>120</sup> Along with his NEC, Clark was the dominant political actor with the vision, energy and resources that pressured the other governmental actors and swayed American public opinion to support conscription. The worsening situation in Europe certainly made their campaign easier, too. General Lewis B. Hershey, Director of the Selective Service System, stated that “every time Hitler bombed London we got another couple of [congressional] votes.”<sup>121</sup>

With its passage, the modern Selective Service System began. The prologue of the Act stated that military service “should be shared generally in accordance with a fair and just system of selective compulsory military training and service.”<sup>122</sup> Every male in the country, including aliens, between the ages of 21 and 36 had to register for the draft, and each was liable for one year of active service followed by 10 years of reserve duty. Those inducted could not be sent outside the Western Hemisphere and no more than 900,000 men could be enrolled under it during peacetime.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> Allowing only 30 days until the registration date was possible largely due to the comprehensive planning since the mid-1920s for a draft by the Joint Army Navy Selective Service Committee (JANSSC) of the War Department. See Flynn’s *The Draft*, 10-21.

<sup>119</sup> Flynn, “The Draft,” 2.

<sup>120</sup> Quoted in Clifford, 38.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., 31-32.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid., 18.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

The vote on the Service Extension Act of 1941 the following year has caused many people to mistakenly believe that the World War II draft was continued by only one vote. This Act addressed whether the service of the initial draftees would be extended. The President and War Department advocated an 18 month extension, fearing the sudden loss of trained personnel given world events. Many members of Congress did not like the idea of violating the one year “contract” that the government had made with the draftees. While the bill passed by 15 votes in the Senate, the vote was 203-202 in the House. Even if the bill had not passed, almost all agree that Congress would have passed a bill with a shorter extension. Regardless, STASA would still have been in effect.<sup>124</sup> Weigley wrote that “General Marshall’s patience and skill in presenting the Army’s case to Congress had probably been indispensable.”<sup>125</sup>

The STASA was very effective in raising the necessary manpower for the United States to win the war. Nearly 50 million men registered and more than 10 million were inducted. Selective service supplied two-thirds of the manpower for the armed forces during the war and allowed the Army to reach its top strength of 89 divisions and 8.3 million men in 1945. More than five million draftees served overseas in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Pacific.<sup>126</sup> The Selective Service System also granted occupational deferments for more than five million workers to ensure critical labor at home.<sup>127</sup> The Selective Service System was also run very well; survey after survey during the war showed unprecedented public approval with the operations of the draft, leading George Gallup to remark: “Few programs in the nation’s history have ever received such an overwhelming favorable vote.”<sup>128</sup>

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<sup>124</sup> O’Sullivan and Meckler, 158.

<sup>125</sup> Weigley, “History,” 434.

<sup>126</sup> Lee and Parker, 13 and Clifford and Spencer, 231.

<sup>127</sup> Millett & Maslowski, 429.

<sup>128</sup> Quoted in Flynn, “*Conscription and Democracy*,” 228.

## The Cold War

When Harry Truman became president on April 12, 1945, he told Congress that the draft needed to be extended in order to continue military operations in Asia. Reluctantly, Congress granted a one-year extension and Truman signed Public Law 54 on May 9, 1945.<sup>129</sup> However, General Hershey, Director of the Selective Service System, advocated an extension beyond 1946 in order to “reassure the peoples of this country and the rest of the world that the United States government is determined to fulfill its obligations in securing the peace for which we fought.”<sup>130</sup>

During the early postwar years, as the Cold War heated up, the Army faced a continued shortage of trained manpower. Citing this shortage, Secretary of State George Marshall warned the Administration: “We are playing with fire while we have nothing with which to put it out.”<sup>131</sup> While the Truman Administration and War Department repeatedly pushed for universal military service unsuccessfully and continuing the draft at least temporarily, Congress responded only to the latter and passed one more one-year extension until March 31, 1947. The House vote was 259 to 110 and there was only one negative vote in the Senate.<sup>132</sup> In early 1947, the military, Congress, and the Administration were all generally in agreement to try an all-volunteer approach. President Truman and the Army allowed the draft to expire in anticipation of congressional approval of UMT and out of a belief that enough men would volunteer.<sup>133</sup> On March 3, 1947, President Truman expressed “the earnest desire of placing our Army and Navy on an entirely volunteer basis at the earliest possible moment.”<sup>134</sup> When the 1940 STASA, and its two one-year extensions, expired on March 31, the draft ended. From April 1947 to June 1948, the armed services relied on volunteers. Unfortunately, the Army needed 30,000 volunteers a

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<sup>129</sup> Ibid., 230-231.

<sup>130</sup> Quoted in Flynn, “Conscription and Democracy,” 231.

<sup>131</sup> Quoted in Lee and Parker, 17.

<sup>132</sup> Flynn, *Conscription and Democracy*, 232.

<sup>133</sup> Griffith, “To Raise and Support Armies,” 27.

<sup>134</sup> Quoted in Gillam, 107.

month, but only 12,000 were enlisting.<sup>135</sup> When General Eisenhower retired from active duty in February 1948, he warned that the Army's strength was 100,000 below appropriated levels and that he anticipated greater manpower shortages ahead.<sup>136</sup>

In early 1948, Soviet Union controlled Poland, most of Eastern Europe and added Czechoslovakia to its control after the Communist coup there on February 24. On March 15, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended immediate reenactment of the draft. A Gallup poll nine days later found 63 percent in favor of conscription. Emphasizing the Communist menace before an emergency joint session of Congress on March 17, President Truman asked for, and Congress gave him America's second peacetime conscription law: the Selective Service Act of 1948. This Act provided for 21 months of service. All men ages 18 to 26 were required to register, but inductees had to be 19.<sup>137</sup> President Truman assured members of Congress and the American people that "selective service would be used only as an interim measure."<sup>138</sup> A House Armed Services Committee report, dated 7 May 1948, stressed that renewal of the draft was "the necessary response of this government to specific, aggressive, and dangerous actions on the part of the Government of the Soviet Union."<sup>139</sup>

The Selective Service Act of 1948 did not induct that many Americans, but did spur voluntary enlistments. By January 30, 1950, more than 10 million men had registered, but Selective Service only inducted 30,129. General Hershey reported that within six months of the passage of the Act, 200,000 more men had enlisted than in the previous comparable period. All in all, some 368,000 men enlisted in the Army and the Air Force, Navy, and Marines met their

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<sup>135</sup> Flynn, *Conscription and Democracy*, 234.

<sup>136</sup> Quoted in Lee and Parker, 16.

<sup>137</sup> Flynn, *Conscription and Democracy*, 234-235; Griffith, "To Raise and Support Armies," 28; and O'Sullivan and Meckler, 205.

<sup>138</sup> Quoted in Cohen, 155.

<sup>139</sup> Flynn, *Conscription and Democracy*, 234.

needs with only volunteers.<sup>140</sup> Professor Eliot Cohen wrote “the draft had, as during the Civil War, provided large numbers of men by eliciting eight or ten volunteers for every conscript.”<sup>141</sup>

When the Selective Service Act of 1948 was about to expire in early 1950, there had been no inductions during the previous 18 months. As a result, Congress was reluctant to pass the Administration’s request of a three-year extension. Debate ended when North Korea crossed the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel and attacked South Korea on June 23, 1950.<sup>142</sup> Congress quickly extended the legislation for an additional year by a vote of 315-4 in the House and 76-0 in the Senate.<sup>143</sup> And in 1951, with little real opposition, Congress placed the Selective Service System on a permanent basis.<sup>144</sup>

The Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 extended the President’s induction authority for four years, granted him the authority to recall reservists, lowered the induction age to 18, lengthened the term of service to two years, and cancelled deferments for married men without children.<sup>145</sup> This law also reaffirmed the principle of universal obligation and created a National Security Training Commission which was to explore the implementation of a UMT program. Congress however never passed legislation implementing this program.<sup>146</sup>

Richard Gillam, an historian, described the general consensus of members of Congress during this period:

There was no objection to the principle of coercion, nor were there any appeals to the virtually dormant ethic of voluntarism. Most legislators remained entirely unwilling to spend the sums necessary to make a military career attractive, while

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<sup>140</sup> Ibid., 235 and Cohen, 156.

<sup>141</sup> Cohen, 155-156.

<sup>142</sup> Sullivan, 163 and Griffith, “To Raise and Support Armies,” 28-29.

<sup>143</sup> *Congressional Quarterly Almanac 81<sup>st</sup> Congress, 2<sup>nd</sup> Session....1950, Volume VI* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly News Features, 1954), 294.

<sup>144</sup> *Congressional Quarterly Almanac 82<sup>nd</sup> Congress, 1<sup>st</sup> Session....1951, Volume VII* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly News Features, 1954), 285.

<sup>145</sup> Witherspoon, 128.

<sup>146</sup> Millett & Maslowski, 516; Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 395; and O’Sullivan and Meckler, 207.

assuming that volunteers would never fill the ranks of an organization offering such unsatisfactory salary inducements.<sup>147</sup>

For now, the values of equality and obligation to serve trumped the values of liberty and voluntarism. Representative Edmund Radwan (R-NY) stated: “We are faced today with an implacable adversary who does not and will not understand our honorable intentions unless these intentions are backed by unquestionable might.”<sup>148</sup> Russia with its global menace of communism was this “implacable adversary.” And in 1955, Senator Richard Russell’s (D-Ga.) comment that “the regular draft is the keystone of the arch of our national defense” was pretty much accepted by all.<sup>149</sup> Appendix A contains the results of the various Gallup polls during the Cold War that indicate the strong level of popular support for the draft.<sup>150</sup>

In 1956, the Democratic presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson questioned the necessity of the draft as a way to attack the popular President Eisenhower. He denounced the draft as “wasteful of young talent” and the short-term service was costly to both the individual and the Department of Defense (DOD).<sup>151</sup> President Eisenhower and Vice President Richard Nixon responded with a stirring defense of the draft and Stevenson generated very little public support for his position (and lost the election).<sup>152</sup>

From the 1950s to the mid-1960s, DOD and the Selective Service rationalized the draft by emphasizing five major points: “the draft stimulated enlistment in all Services; higher aptitude candidates were induced by draft pressure to voluntarily enlist in 3- and 4-year training programs; the threat of being drafted supported officer training programs; conscription supported the reserve forces; and the all volunteer policy had failed from 1947 to 1948, and would be too expensive to

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<sup>147</sup> Gillam, 113.

<sup>148</sup> Quoted in Gillam, 112.

<sup>149</sup> Quoted in Gillam, 113.

<sup>150</sup> *The Gallup Poll Public Opinion, 1935-1997*, The CD-ROM Edition (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 2000) and Darren K. Carlson, “Americans Remain Down on Draft,” 9 November 2004, Gallup Poll News Service accessed at <http://www.gallup.com/poll/content/print.aspx?ci=13999>.

<sup>151</sup> Flynn, *Conscription and Democracy*, 235.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid.

sustain and equip the force size required.”<sup>153</sup> After the Korean War until relatively late in the Vietnam War, members of Congress and the American people widely accepted these views. The renewal of draft authority at four year intervals in 1955, 1959, and 1963 were all by overwhelming congressional majorities as the numbers in Table 1 indicate. The extension in 1967 was noteworthy in that its passage was also by overwhelming majorities despite the vote occurring in the midst of the Vietnam War and after Congress spent more than a year holding hearings and engaging in vigorous public debate. All that resulted in the law’s final form was little more than another four year extension until July 1, 1971.<sup>154</sup>

**Table 1: Selective Service Votes, 1955-1967**

YEAR	1955	1959	1963	1967
House of Representatives	389-5	381-20	388-3	377-29
Senate	Voice Vote	90-1	Voice Vote	72-23

For 27 years of the Cold War (1945-1947 and 1948-1973), this “interim” measure of conscription became the permanent manpower policy for the United States. From 1965 to 1973 alone, there were 1,728,254 inductions through selective service.<sup>155</sup> As opposition and resistance to that protracted conflict in Vietnam intensified and grew, so did protest against the draft system and these inductions. In 1956, 77 percent of the population supported the draft. In 1970, a bare minority supported the draft; one survey in 1972 reported only 13 percent did.<sup>156</sup> With a shift in public support this large, it is perhaps easy to see why President Nixon led the charge against the draft and advocated volunteer recruitment. The next section will briefly discuss the dominant role President Nixon had in changing America’s military to an all-volunteer force.

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<sup>153</sup> Lee and Parker, 23.

<sup>154</sup> *Congressional Quarterly Almanac 90<sup>th</sup> Congress, 1<sup>st</sup> Session....1967, Volume XXIII* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1968), 260. The votes for 1955, 1959, and 1963 are found in each *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* for each respective year.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid., 256.

## The Creation of the All-Volunteer Force

Among the numerous books that discuss the evolution and creation of the all-volunteer force (AVF), almost all cite two main reasons why the AVF replaced conscription as the United States' policy for manning its armed forces: the war in Vietnam and the efforts of President Nixon. When President Lyndon Johnson contemplated sending reinforcements to Vietnam in 1965, he sought former President Eisenhower's opinion. President Eisenhower approved of the increase, but warned that "sending conscripted troops to Vietnam would cause a major public-relations problem," which is actually what happened to the United States government and its politicians.<sup>157</sup> Robert Griffith, an historian, provided a sound explanation on why "the draft was a natural casualty of the longest, most unpopular war in American history:"

Inductions from 1954 to 1964 averaged 100,000 a year. As American involvement in Vietnam escalated, so did conscription...In 1966, 400,000 were called. Casualties also increased, especially among draftees. Draftees, who constituted only 16 percent of the armed forces, but 88 percent of infantry soldiers in Vietnam, accounted for over 50 percent of combat deaths in 1969, a peak year for casualties. Little wonder that the draft became the focus of anti-Vietnam activism.<sup>158</sup>

Due to the various exemptions granted to students pursuing college, graduate and professional degrees, high school dropouts were twice as likely to be drafted as college graduates.<sup>159</sup> Protest against the war focused on that draft system that was "sending minorities and underprivileged youth to die in the jungles of Southeast Asia."<sup>160</sup>

The other main reason for the adoption of the AVF was President Nixon. Professor Flynn wrote that in the creation of the AVF, President Nixon "was truly an event-making leader," who "decided to end the draft not because it was failing but because its political cost had become too high." Furthermore, Flynn argued that "politics was to the Nixon White House as gravity was to

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<sup>156</sup> Cohen, 164.

<sup>157</sup> Flynn, "The Draft," 165.

<sup>158</sup> Griffith, "Conscription and the Army," 23.

<sup>159</sup> Marc Magee, *From Selective Service to National Service*, Progressive Policy Institute Policy Report (July 2003): 2.

the solar system.” By attacking the draft, Nixon would gain “a positive image, especially on the campus and with intellectuals generally”—two groups normally supportive of the Democratic Party.<sup>161</sup> On October 17, 1968, Nixon, the Republican presidential candidate, made a campaign promise to seek to end the draft when the Vietnam War was over. In his campaign speech, Nixon stated:

A system of compulsory service that arbitrarily selects some and not others simply cannot be squared with our whole concept of liberty, justice and equality under the law...the only way to stop the inequities is to stop using the system...Today all across our country we face a crisis of confidence. Nowhere is it more acute than among our young people. They recognize the draft as an infringement on their liberty, which it is. To them, it represents a government insensitive to their rights, a government callous to their status as free men. They ask for justice, and they deserve it. So I say, it's time we look at our consciences. Let's show our commitment to freedom by preparing to assure our young people theirs.<sup>162</sup>

By appealing to America’s youth, Nixon hoped to deflate campus protests against the war and the draft.

A major influence on Nixon and his stance on the AVF was Dr. Martin Anderson, “the person who was almost singly responsible for placing this policy issue in front of a policy-maker and seeing that the policy decision was implemented.”<sup>163</sup> Anderson was a young economics professor who worked on the President’s campaign, then was a senior White House advisor.<sup>164</sup> Anderson repeatedly told Nixon that the AVF was an issue he could “use to establish a rapport with the youth of the country.”<sup>165</sup> Anderson made key recommendations regarding the composition of the President’s blue ribbon panel to study the AVF and he worked feverishly with various economists to justify the economics of the AVF.<sup>166</sup>

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<sup>160</sup> Flynn, “Conscription and Democracy,” 236.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid., 256, 263 and 237.

<sup>162</sup> Lee and Parker, 29-30.

<sup>163</sup> Ralph P. Witherspoon, “The Military Draft and the All-Volunteer Force: A Case Study of A Shift in Public Policy” (Ph.D. diss., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1993), 409.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid., 406.

<sup>165</sup> Flynn, “The Draft,” 263.

<sup>166</sup> Witherspoon, 339 and Flynn, “Conscription and Democracy,” 237.

A Gallup poll in the first week of January 1969 found 62 percent preferred continuing the draft and only 31 percent favored volunteers.<sup>167</sup> Contrary to polls showing continued strong support for the draft, President Nixon decided it was time for a change. On March 27, 1969, President Nixon appointed a commission, led by former Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates “to develop a comprehensive plan for eliminating conscription and moving toward an All Volunteer Armed Force.”<sup>168</sup> On May 13, 1969, even before this commission submitted its report, President Nixon informed Congress that reform meant replacement with volunteers in his Special Message to Congress on Reforming the Military Draft.<sup>169</sup>

In February 1970, the Gates Commission released its favorable AVF report: “We unanimously believe that the nation’s interests will be better served by an all-volunteer force, supported by an effective stand-by draft, than by a mixed force of volunteers and conscripts; that steps should be taken promptly to move in this direction.”<sup>170</sup> The Gates Commission basic premise was that “conscription is a form of taxation, the power to conscript is the power to tax.”<sup>171</sup> Military service was no longer seen as an obligation, but as a tax on America’s youth. The Gates Report further stated: “When not all our citizens can serve, and when only a small minority are needed, a voluntary decision to serve is the best answer, morally and practically, to the question of who should serve.”<sup>172</sup> The Commission believed that the military could entice enough volunteers to enlist by increasing pay, improving conditions of service and more vigorous recruiting.<sup>173</sup>

In February 1971, Congress began an extensive eight month debate on the AVF, with both chairmen of the Armed Services Committees, Senator John Stennis (D-Miss.) and

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<sup>167</sup> Flynn, “The Draft,” 226.

<sup>168</sup> Lee and Parker, 38.

<sup>169</sup> Cohen, 166.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid., 166-167.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid., 167.

<sup>172</sup> Clifford and Spencer, 227-228.

<sup>173</sup> O’Sullivan and Meckler, 270.

Representative F. Edward Hebert (D-La.), opposing a volunteer army, but started hearings because the President requested it.<sup>174</sup> In September, the House passed the bill by a vote of 297 to 108 and the Senate did likewise by a vote of 55 to 30.<sup>175</sup> On September 28, 1971, President Nixon signed Public Law 92-129, which extended the draft induction authority for only two more years and raised military pay significantly—an initial step toward the AVF. At the signing, President Nixon stated:

I am most hopeful that this is the last time a President must sign an extension of draft induction authority. Although it will remain necessary to retain a standby draft system in the interest of national security, this administration is committed to achieving the reforms in military life as well as the public support for our Armed Forces which will make possible an end to peacetime conscription.<sup>176</sup>

In March 1973, Secretary of Defense Elliott Richardson told the Chairmen of the Armed Service Committees that no further extension of the draft was necessary beyond July 1, 1973.<sup>177</sup>

The United States implemented a remarkable change in its manpower policy in 1973. Prior to the creation of the AVF, the United States had a draft for 27 years during the Cold War, in which a composite force of draftees and volunteers served, that was widely accepted by politicians and the American people for all of that period except for the last three to four years when Vietnam protests became intertwined with draft protests. There were two primary reasons for this broad public acceptance for conscription: the nature of the Communist threat with the Soviet Union and the need for a reliable and steady source of manpower which the draft provided and volunteers did not.

Although the Cold War continued until November 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall, for the last 16 years of this “war,” the nation relied on a professional force composed of volunteers alone. During this post-Vietnam period of the Cold War, the American military saw

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<sup>174</sup> Griffith, “To Raise and Support Armies,” 35.

<sup>175</sup> Lee and Parker, 143-147.

<sup>176</sup> “Statement on Signing Bill Authorizing Extension of the Draft and Increases in Military Pay, September 28, 1971,” *Public Papers of the Presidents-Richard Nixon, 1971* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), 1008-1009.

little action with the exception of fighting in places like Grenada. Even after the Cold War was over, the nation relied on volunteers to fight other small wars in Panama, Somalia, Haiti and Afghanistan and big wars in Iraq twice. Now, given extended combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and additional troop commitments in South Korea, the Balkans, and other places all over the world, there has been much media coverage and public discussion about an over-extended force. In our nation's history, volunteers have never been able to provide the required manpower necessary to fight a protracted conflict. The future viability of the AVF is indeed questionable as the war/insurgency in Iraq drags on, tensions with Iran and North Korea heat up, and the global war of terrorism continues.

### **Insights from Historical Draft Periods and the AVF**

Representative Carl Vinson (D-Ga.), one of the lasting proponents of peacetime conscription, declared that there "can be no justification in normal peacetime for a draft in order to provide men to man the Army and Navy. The only justification for a draft is when there is a national emergency confronting the country."<sup>178</sup> Thus, external threat is a key factor, present during every draft period. Not only was the threat real, but it was also one that was not ending anytime soon. Although the external threat and the resulting perceived long term emergency to the nation were important and necessary conditions before each draft enactment, these alone were not sufficient. In Kingdon's terminology, these external threats were simply problems. For the Civil War, the problem was the Confederate Union that seceded. In both World War I and II, it was primarily Germany. The Cold War problem was the Soviet Union and Communism. These problems "opened" a policy window to allow political actors—presidents, members of Congress, the military, influential citizens and lobbying groups—a chance to advocate, push, and enact their

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<sup>177</sup> Lee and Parker, 35.

<sup>178</sup> Quoted in Gillam, 106.

policies or to block others'. During these draft periods, the actors saw volunteering as a policy that was unable to meet the nation's manpower needs.

For military issues that involve raising and supporting an army, the commonly held assumption is that Congress plays the dominant role in enacting the policy. This is not always the case though, especially given the analysis of the four major draft periods. Perhaps due to the nature of the U.S. political system with its pluralistic society and the multiple points of access provided by our government's separation of powers, it should not be a surprise that each draft period had a different dominant actor. During the Civil War, Congress took the lead although President Lincoln and Secretary of War Stanton operated outside the public's view. In World War I, the dominant actor was the military, especially General Scott and the Army General Staff, which pressured first the Secretary of War, and then President Wilson to act. Prior to World War II, it was Greenville Clark, a prominent, rich and well-connected attorney and his group that pressured Congress to act while President Roosevelt, General Marshal, and the War Department were hesitant and non-supportive. And during the Cold War, the dominant actor was the president, who called for draft extensions and kept peacetime conscription as the permanent manpower policy for the United States with overwhelming support by Congress. Likewise for the creation of the AVF, President Nixon was the dominant actor who responded to the domestic political crisis that resulted from the Vietnam War.

There are four more insights from this historical analysis of past draft periods. First, these four draft periods represent only a small portion (35 years) of our nation's history. Second, for the Civil War, World War I, World War II, and for more than half of the Cold War, volunteering did not produce sufficient manpower; a system of selective service was mandatory for these large-scale, protracted conflicts.<sup>179</sup> Third, the use of conscription spurred volunteer enlistments, not only for the Regular Army, but also for the Reserve and Guard. During each period, the presence

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<sup>179</sup> Kreidberg, 695.

of a draft prompted men to volunteer. Fourth, with the exception of periods of the Civil War and the last four years of the Vietnam War, politicians and the public widely accepted the use of the draft. Protest against the draft has been minimal during most of the time that the nation used this manpower policy. Yet, when people discuss the draft today, they tend to remember how the class-biased draft of the Vietnam War helped drive Americans apart and forget the more equitable draft that existed during World War II and for most of the Cold War that helped bring the country together.<sup>180</sup>

There are also two insights from the creation of the AVF. First, the “Volunteer Military Posture” to replace the draft was supposed to be “accompanied by a robust standby draft system as a hedge against a large or protracted war requiring manpower in excess of the AVF’s capacity to provide.”<sup>181</sup> This system has never been established. The only step taken in this direction was on June 27 1980, when Congress, at President Jimmy Carter’s request after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, enacted a law requiring all 18 year old men to register for possible military service.<sup>182</sup> This is a far cry from a scenario in which “young men would continue to register and be examined and classified, creating a yearly reserve pool available for immediate induction.”<sup>183</sup> Second, “the essence of a volunteer military is that it obliges no one to serve his country.”<sup>184</sup> While the creation of the AVF deflated political opposition to the Vietnam War, it also weakened the idea of a universal military service obligation. The focus was on a market-based approach with having the right pay and benefits in order to prompt volunteers to enlist and serve. It is now time to turn to the contemporary period and examine recent legislative efforts to bring back the draft.

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<sup>180</sup> Moskos and Glastris, 11.

<sup>181</sup> Record, 234.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid., 234 and Flynn, “The Draft,” 278.

<sup>183</sup> Robert D. Ford, “Volunteer draft could replenish military ranks,” *Harrisburg Sunday Patriot News*, 9 January 2005, F1.

<sup>184</sup> Record, 235.

## A 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY DRAFT?

The society that draws a line between its fighting men and its thinking men will find its fighting done by fools and its thinking done by cowards.

Sir William Francis Butler<sup>185</sup>

If the rich could hire the poor to die for them, what a living the poor would make.

Anonymous Wit<sup>186</sup>

Debate on a return to a military draft has been almost non-existent since its ending in 1973 notwithstanding the occasional call when the economy was particularly strong and volunteers were not as forthcoming to enlist. On January 7, 2003, Representative Charles Rangel (D-NY), a Korean War veteran (a field artilleryman!) and draftee, introduced H.R. 163, the Universal National Service Act of 2003. Senator Fritz Hollings (D-SC) introduced identical legislation, S.89, on the same day in the Senate.<sup>187</sup> The purpose of both bills was: “To provide for the common defense by requiring that all young persons in the United States, including women, perform a period of military service or a period of civilian service in furtherance of the national defense and homeland security, and for other purposes.”<sup>188</sup> It required all persons (to include women for the first time) in the United States between the ages of 18 and 26 to serve for a period of two years. The only education deferment would be for high school students until they obtained a diploma or turned 20.

No action has been taken on this bill in the Senate, but H.R. 163 came to a vote in the House of Representatives on October 5, 2004 and overwhelming defeated by a vote of 402 to 2. Only Representatives John Murtha (D-Pa.) and Fortney Stark (D-CA) voted in favor of the bill. Murtha, a leading Democrat on military issues, stated it was time for Congress to give some thought to future military manpower needs. Rangel voted against his own bill and stated “it is a

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<sup>185</sup> Ibid., 225.

<sup>186</sup> Ibid., 261.

<sup>187</sup> “Military Draft,” *Congressional Digest* (May 2004): 141.

<sup>188</sup> Accessed at <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:HR00163>.

prostitution of the legislative process to take a serious issue and use it for political purposes on the eve of the election just to say they are against the draft.”<sup>189</sup>

During an Advanced Operational Arts Studies fellowship trip to Washington, DC in September 2004, I interviewed Representative Rangel in his Rayburn office. While admitting that there were some political motives behind his advocacy for his bill, it was clear that his overriding motivation was one “if we are going to send our youth to war, the governing principle must be that of shared sacrifice--everyone is doing something.” He emphasized that the military aspect was just one portion of his bill and that there were many more needs for national service: “homeland security needs are huge.” He spoke fondly of his draftee days and stated that “anyone who has ever served their nation, almost all brag about their experiences and sense of camaraderie.” A primary result of his legislation would be to “instill a love of country and sense of obligation” among young Americans today. He also foresaw the continuing deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq and believed “governors, businesses and middle class Americans will become upset over the use and deployment of the Reserves and Guard at unprecedented levels” and that the military would “see a problem with retention and recruitment.” He firmly believed that “the military needs of DOD would have to be met by more than just raising incentives.”<sup>190</sup>

As the introduction of the monograph discussed, currently no one in the military, Department of Defense, or White House is advocating a return to the draft or even discussing it. In early February 2005, I asked Dr. Curtis Gilroy, Director of Accession Policy in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, if there was anything new in OSD concerning a return to the draft. He told me that “there is no discussion at all with respect to reinstituting the draft. It is a non-issue, and would be dead on arrival. The House voted 400-2

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<sup>189</sup> Hulse, A13.

<sup>190</sup> Interview with author on 13 September 2004.

against the Rangel bill and the Administration is vehemently opposed.”<sup>191</sup> The Selective Service Agency posted a similar statement on its website:

Notwithstanding recent stories in the news media and on the Internet, Selective service is not getting ready to conduct a draft for the U.S. Armed Forces—either a special skills or regular draft. Rather, the Agency remains prepared to manage a draft if and when the President and the Congress so direct. This responsibility has been ongoing since 1980 and is nothing new. Further, both the President and the Secretary of Defense have stated on more than one occasion that there is no need for a draft for the war on terrorism or any likely contingency, such as Iraq.<sup>192</sup>

According to the latest Gallup public opinion poll conducted October 11-14, 2004 on whether the United States should return to a military draft, only 14 percent of Americans answered yes, the lowest percentage ever (See Appendix A: Gallup Polls on the Draft).<sup>193</sup>

Despite the current lack of support for a return to a draft by the military, public and politicians, a military draft would offer several advantages over the AVF. Most importantly, a draft would provide the nation the necessary personnel to man its forces as it wages this protracted campaign against terrorism. The AVF does not provide much strategic flexibility and cannot mobilize in times of crisis. A draft would be more equitable and would expand the base of those who serve, enriching not only the military, but also society. Broadening those who have military experience has an educational effect on society and ensures that the military remains connected to the society it protects. Budget costs of a draft would most likely be lower than the AVF if Congress passed a policy of lower pay for draftees. And a draft would reinforce the concept of citizenship that entails responsibilities of service as well as rights.

Additionally, a draft-based force does not necessarily mean a less professional or combat-effective force. Retired Major General Robert Scales, former Commandant of the Army War College, opposes a draft because “we don’t want an army of amateurs and units of strangers.”<sup>194</sup>

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<sup>191</sup> Dr Gilroy email to author, dated 10 February 2005.

<sup>192</sup> “Military Draft,” 141.

<sup>193</sup> Carlson, “Americans Remain Down on Draft.”

<sup>194</sup> Morton M. Kondracke, “Army, Marines Need Priority In Rumsfeld’s New Defense Review,” *Roll Call*, 17 March, 2005, accessed at <http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20050318358348.html>.

Interestingly, Professor John Warner and Beth Asch, two pro-AVF economists, emphasized a fundamental point that is often ignored:

...the choice is not between a volunteer force and a pure draft force. Officers have usually not been drafted in the United States and enlisted personnel serving beyond their initial obligation have always been volunteers. **Even at the height of the Vietnam War, draftees made up only about half of the enlisted force.** The choice is between a pure volunteer force and a mixed force of volunteers (some draft-induced) and draftees (emphasis added).<sup>195</sup>

Even with a conscript-based force, the professional officer corps and non-commissioned officer corps would still be present. Plus like all previous draft periods, those volunteering to serve would most likely increase with a return to conscription (draft-induced). The quality of the conscript, which would include the previously college bound individual (who is largely unrepresented in the enlisted AVF) would be higher than now. There are also hundreds of thousands of military jobs that could be manned by short-term draftees. There are 31 military occupational specialties (MOS), including infantryman (11B), military police (95B), motor transport operator (88M), and wheeled vehicle mechanic (63B), that have 21 weeks or less of initial entry training (basic and advanced individual training). Assuming a two year term of service, draftees would spend at least three times as much with their unit as they do in initial training.<sup>196</sup> The bottom line is that the professionalism and combat effectiveness of a draft-based force would probably not be much different than the current force.

Although not given much media or political attention, another possibility of conscription in the near future could be a special skills draft, especially for health care personnel. The military is short nurses and dentists; physician assistants are also in high demand.<sup>197</sup> The American Medical Association is concerned about a “doctor’s draft” and the Selective Service System is reengineering its special skills mission. Colonel Roger Lalich, Wisconsin Army National Guard

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<sup>195</sup> John T. Warner and Beth J. Asch, “The Economic Theory of A Military Draft Reconsidered,” *Defence and Peace Economics*, Vol. 7 (1996): 170.

<sup>196</sup> Moskos and Glastris, 10 and Magee and Nider “Uncle Sam Wants You!,” 4-5.

State Surgeon, wrote that “currently this mission is only for health care personnel, but in the future it is foreseeable it may include linguists, environmental engineers, computer specialists, and other professionals.”<sup>198</sup> The implementation of a selective draft of this kind for special skills would probably have little chance of political adoption due to the unfairness of only certain persons being called to serve, but could be more acceptable as part of a broad based national service program or military draft.

The United States is a nation at war, although the Army and the Marines are largely bearing this burden and sacrifice. This global war on terrorism is a protracted conflict with no end in sight. Similar to previous periods when our nation adopted conscription, the external threat is present and does not appear to be going away anytime soon. Given the views of the Administration, most members of Congress, and the American people, there does not appear to be any policy window “open” at this time for a return to the draft. There is obviously no dominant political actor as of yet calling for conscription.<sup>199</sup> However, with the protracted campaign against terrorism and continuing recruitment shortages, a policy window may be “opening” and we just do not realize yet. In the current issue of the *Washington Monthly*, journalists Phillip Carter and Paul Glastris argued that America faces a choice. “It can be the world’s superpower, or it can maintain the current all-volunteer military, but it probably can’t do both.”<sup>200</sup> Beth Asch, a Rand Corporation economist specializing in military personnel issues, stated, “What we don’t know is if the old tools—more recruiters, bonuses and education benefits—will work in the same way as

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<sup>197</sup> “Medical recruiting, retention holding own,” *Association of the United States Army News* (April 2005), 14.

<sup>198</sup> Christopher Windham, “Possibility Of A Military Draft Of Doctors Worries The AMA,” *Wall Street Journal*, 8 December 2004, D6 accessed at <http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/efiles/e20041208340913.html>. Quote is from Roger A. Lalich, “Health care personnel delivery system: Another doctor draft?” *Wisconsin Medical Journal* 103, no. 1 (2004): 24.

<sup>199</sup> Professor Kingdon thinks that while a problem certainly exists (“the military needs personnel and is falling short”), he is “not so sure that there’s an open window for a draft just now,” primarily because there are so few advocates, especially in “military or political circles” (Email to author, dated 31 March 2005).

<sup>200</sup> Phillip Carter and Paul Glastris, “The Case for the Draft,” *The Washington Monthly* (March 2005) accessed at <http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2005/0503.carter.html>.

they have in the past.”<sup>201</sup> Historically as the four periods of our nation’s drafts illustrate, volunteerism has not worked during prolonged conflicts.

Furthermore, a projection of current demographic trends in the United States and abroad could provide support for a policy window opening for a return to the draft or national service. In the spring issue of *Parameters*, Professor George Quester wrote: “Yet distinct possibilities loom that trends in demography, some of which are inexorable, will very much stress current US recruiting and retention practices.” Two trends are of particular importance. The most important demographic will be the “graying” of the population, “in America and all the advanced industrialized countries, as lower birthrates and longer life-spans project that a larger proportion of the total population will be above what was viewed, until recently, as the normal age for retirement.”<sup>202</sup> The total number of young people in America will certainly decline as a percentage of the overall population and there will be a much greater need for workers to take care of the elderly. The second trend concerns the continuing high birthrates in third world countries, which will only exacerbate the already substantial flow of illegal aliens into the United States.<sup>203</sup> A broad national service program, the subject of the next section, would support the military’s manpower needs, provide care for the elderly, protect and secure the nation’s borders as well as provide additional benefits.

## A NEW KIND OF DRAFT: NATIONAL SERVICE

The reality is that homeland defense in the war on terrorism is bound to be labor-intensive, as demanding of manpower as the big wars of the past. But we do not have the vital tool we used in those wars: the draft.

David Broder<sup>204</sup>

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<sup>201</sup> Quoted in Eric Schmitt, “Army Officials Voice Concern Over Shortfall In Recruitment,” *The New York Times*, 4 March 2005, A13.

<sup>202</sup> George H. Quester, “Demographic Trends and Military Recruitment: Surprising Possibilities,” *Parameters* (Spring 2005): 39.

<sup>203</sup> Quester, 35.

<sup>204</sup> Quoted in Doug Bandow, “Fighting the War against Terrorism: Elite Forces, Yes; Conscripts, No.” *Cato Policy Analysis No. 430*, 10 April 2002, 6.

A system of universal training—military, civil-defense or related skills that could be called into use on short notice to combat terrorism—would reduce [the gap between military and civilian society] and make the USA more democratic and, at the same time, a safer place to live.

Philip Meyer<sup>205</sup>

Most people trace the idea of national service to William James' essay, "The Moral Equivalent of War," written in 1910. James wanted to contrast the destructiveness of war with its more noble qualities: "intrepidity, contempt for softness, surrender of private interest, obedience to command."<sup>206</sup> He argued that national service was a means by which a democratic nation could maintain social cohesion without having to fight a war. Military service and civilian service, both forms of national service, involve "the performance of citizen duties that give individuals a sense of the civic whole, a whole that is more important than any single person or group of persons."<sup>207</sup>

In its past, the United States has had several national service programs, although limited in scope. During the Great Depression, President Roosevelt persuaded Congress to establish a Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), a program that gave more than 2.5 million young men the opportunity to work in disaster relief and maintain the nation's beaches, forests, parks and rivers. Another New Deal national service program was the National Youth Administration, an urban program from 1935-43 that gave more than five million young men and women the opportunity to serve. In 1961, President John Kennedy created the Peace Corps. Since its creation, more than 168,000 Americans have provided good will and services in 136 countries all over the world. In 1964, President Johnson started a domestic version of the Peace Corps with the Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA) as part of his Great Society program and war against poverty. In 1993 with the National and Community Service Act, President William Clinton launched AmeriCorps, where volunteers worked at "non profit agencies, community centers, parks,

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<sup>205</sup> Ibid.

<sup>206</sup> Charles C. Moskos and John Sibley Butler, *All That We Can Be: Black Leadership and Racial Integration the Army Way* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, Inc., 1996): 145.

<sup>207</sup> Ibid.

governmental agencies, and public hospitals” focusing on “education, public safety, human services, and environmental services.”<sup>208</sup> After 9/11, President George Bush created USA Freedom Corps, consisting of AmeriCorps, Peace Corps, Senior Corps, Learn and Serve America, and the newly created Citizen Corps, a program focused on national emergencies and homeland security.<sup>209</sup>

Shortly after the September 11 terrorist attacks, *The Washington Monthly* published an article, “Now Do You Believe We Need a Draft?” by Charles Moskos and Paul Glastris. They wrote:

America needs to wake up. We’re at war. We need a draft. But because this is a new kind of conflict, we need a new kind of draft. A 21<sup>st</sup> century draft would be less focused on preparing men for conventional combat which probably won’t be that extensive in this war—than on the arguably more daunting task of guarding against and responding to terrorism at home and abroad. If structured right, this new draft might not be as tough to sell as you might think.<sup>210</sup>

Historically, most Americans favor national service programs as indicated by the results of Gallup polls displayed in Appendix B. Support for such programs is higher when they are voluntary. When people are required to serve, support for mandatory service drops significantly.<sup>211</sup>

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<sup>208</sup> Ibid., 158. For more details on the various national service programs, see Appendix on National Service in Moskos and Butler; Charles C. Moskos, *A Call To Civic Service: National Service for Country and Community* (New York: The Free Press, 1988); E.J. Dionne, Jr., Kayla Meltzer Drogosz, and Robert E. Litan, ed. *United We Serve: National Service and the Future of Citizenship* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003); “National and Community Service,” *Congressional Digest* (October 1993); and Magee, *From Selective Service to National Service*.

<sup>209</sup> Charles Moskos, “Patriotism-Lite Meets the Citizen-Soldier,” and Harris Wofford, “The Politics of Service,” in ed. E.J. Dionne, Jr., Kayla Meltzer Drogosz, and Robert E. Litan, *United We Serve: National Service and the Future of Citizenship* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 40 and 51.

<sup>210</sup> Moksos and Glastris, 9.

<sup>211</sup> See Appendix II in Magee’s “From Selective Service to National Service” for various Penn/Schoen/Berland and PSRA/Pew Forum polls in 1999 and 2002. A 1999 Penn/Schoen/Berland poll found 74 percent of the public supported “a universal system of national citizen service where young adults would be called upon to serve their country either through military or community service.” A 2002 PSRA/Pew Forum poll found that 81 percent of 18-29 year olds supported this “call to service” system. However when this service became mandatory, this same poll found only 43 percent in support if only men were required and only 36 percent in support if women were also required to serve (Magee, 12).

Moskos further commented that “the two main reasons we have not seen a surge of enlistment on elite college campuses since Sept. 11 are the long enlistments pushed by military recruiters and the fact that President Bush has yet to include military service in his overall call to service to the nation.”<sup>212</sup> An indication of the potential of a national call to service comes from the recent efforts of Senators John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Evan Bayh (D-Ind.). Despite opposition from DOD, both senators were in favor of a short-term citizen-soldier enlistment program, where volunteers sign up for 18 months of service on active duty, followed by 24 months of service in the Reserves and earn an \$18,000 education grant. Their “call to service” initiative, signed into law as part of the 2003 defense authorization, represented what many people call “the most important change in military recruitment policy since the draft was ended.”<sup>213</sup> Designed to promote and facilitate military enlistment in support of national service, this short-term enlistment program is ideally suited for that college bound person or graduate who does not want the long-term enlistment typically offered by recruiters, but still wants to serve. Although DOD does not have to issue an evaluation of this new program until March 2005, preliminary indications are that the program is receiving an enthusiastic response.<sup>214</sup>

Today, there are approximately four million youth (men and women) who reach the age of 18 annually. Approximately 58 per cent of this eligible youth population is not eligible to serve in the military due to drugs/alcohol, dependents, judicial, and physical/mental reasons.<sup>215</sup> But it is likely that some could be useful in other non-military jobs. One of the major problems with the draft during the Vietnam War was the large number of exemptions and the unfairness of only

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<sup>212</sup> Quoted in Magee and Nider, “Citizen Soldiers and the War on Terror,” 6.

<sup>213</sup> Marc Magee and Steven J. Nider, “A Call to Service in a Time of War,” *Blueprint Magazine*, 11 February 2003, accessed at <http://www.pponline.org/ndol/print.cfm?contentid=251222> and *Citizen Soldiers and the War on Terror*. Progressive Policy Institute Policy Report (December 2002), 1-2.

<sup>214</sup> Dr. Curtis Gilroy email, dated 10 February 2005 and Marc Magee and Steven J. Nider, “Expand The Call to Service,” *Blueprint Magazine*, 23 March 2004, accessed at <http://www.pponline.org/ndol/print.cfm?contentid=252480>. This program has a higher percentage of college-educated and college-bound enlistees than traditional enlistment programs.

<sup>215</sup> “Military Draft,” *Congressional Digest* (May 2004): 134 and Dr. Gilroy’s PowerPoint briefing, slide 21, “Trends in Eligibility.”

certain individuals being drafted. With the creation of a twenty-first century universal service program that required one of four types of service before any student could attend a college or university, the fundamental premise would be all 18 year olds must serve for a term of 12 to 24 months, but that participants would be able to make a personal choice where they served. For a more acceptable political solution, politicians could start initially with a volunteer national service program to avoid issues of compulsion associated with a universal program. Appendix C has a sample of a “Call to National Service” card that all male and female 18 year olds would be required to submit, similar to the process than all 18 year old males register for Selective Service now.<sup>216</sup>

Participants could fulfill their obligation in one of four ways: in the military, in AmeriCorps (taking care of the elderly, tutoring disadvantaged children), in homeland security (serving as custom agents, guarding ports, or border patrols), or the Peace Corps. All participants would receive modest pay and GI Bill type college grants. Those who sign up for the military option with longer and more risky duty would receive higher pay and larger college grants. The United States currently spends \$20 billion in grants and loan subsidies to college students without receiving anything in return.<sup>217</sup> It is important to establish a link for federal college aid to participants who serve in either a military or civilian national service program. Moskos wrote that it was “noteworthy that a 1995 Gallup poll found that 40 percent of the American public favored this proposition [link federal college aid to service], an amazing level of support for a concept that has not even entered the public debate.”<sup>218</sup>

Not only would this type of program ensure that the military would have the manpower that it needs, the nation would be making a serious commitment to vital domestic missions, such

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<sup>216</sup> See Magee, *From Selective Service to National Service*, 7-11 for further discussion of how a National Service System would work. The sample card in Appendix C is a modified version of one he developed. I have added a Citizen Corps category for homeland security.

<sup>217</sup> Moskos, “Patriotism-Lite Meets the Citizen-Soldier,” 36.

<sup>218</sup> Ibid.

as caring for the elderly and defending the homeland. Given demographic projections, the aging baby boomers will stress the geriatric system, requiring a much greater need for care of the elderly. An expanded AmeriCorps could meet this need. For homeland security, an expanded Citizen Corps is also needed. Recent media is replete with headlines of “Our Terrorist-Friendly Borders,” “Border Patrol Overwhelmed,” and “Both parties criticize border security, funds.”<sup>219</sup> One border patrol agent emphasized that “we are not winning this war.”<sup>220</sup> Agents only catch about one-third of the estimated three million people who cross the border illegally every year. And what is particularly troubling is the increasing numbers of “OTMs”—other than Mexicans. In 2004, there were 65,814 OTMs arrested and Homeland Security officials worry that Al-Qaeda is using this avenue for entry into the United States to conduct future terrorist attacks.<sup>221</sup> Furthermore, our vulnerability is not limited to only land as port security is now called the nation’s “soft underbelly.”<sup>222</sup> Again, it is easy to see how a broad-based national service program could help increase our homeland security by providing needed manpower along the borders and in the ports.

By expanding the size and the work of the Peace Corps, the United States would be able to do a much better job of winning the hearts and minds of citizens in Third World countries, making an impact in the struggle against terrorism. Currently, the Peace Corps only averages about 6,500 members a year, with its peak at 16,000 members in 1966. Marc Magee, director of the Center for Civic Enterprise at the Progressive Policy Institute, believes “what is needed now is an effort to connect this service program to the new challenges of this new century by

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<sup>219</sup> “Our Terrorist-Friendly Borders,” *The New York Times*, 21 March 2005, A20; “Despite new technology, Border Patrol overwhelmed,” *USA Today*, 23 February 2005, 10A; and “Both parties criticize border security, funds,” *Dallas Morning News*, 4 March 2005, 11A.

<sup>220</sup> Eric Lipton, “Despite New Efforts Along Arizona Border, ‘Serious Problems’ Remain,” *The New York Times*, 14 March 2005, A16.

<sup>221</sup> Mimi Hall, “Despite new technology, Border Patrol overwhelmed,” *USA Today*, 23 February 2005, 10A.

<sup>222</sup> “Follow the Port Security Money,” *The New York Times*, 28 February 2005, A24.

expanding its focus beyond sustainable development to include civic projects most likely to reduce the conditions that fuel terrorism.”<sup>223</sup>

A national service program would have similar benefits that were discussed with the adoption of a draft. This program would not only provide the nation the necessary personnel to man its armed forces but would also provide volunteers in a host of other vital areas: homeland security, care for the elderly, helping disadvantaged youth, and serving abroad. Beyond instilling a new ethic of service in young Americans, a major advantage of a volunteer national service program that included the military, AmeriCorps, Citizens Corps (for homeland security needs), and the Peace Corps would be the bringing together of Americans from diverse backgrounds. The recollection of one of the founders of the Plattsburg military camps of 1913-1916 illustrates this advantage:

That which most entertained impressed the country was the spectacle of the rich man or the favored of fortune digging trenches with a pick or otherwise deliberately submitting to unaccustomed toil and strange hardships. People read about it because it was funny, but they saw what it meant. **They saw that the spirit of service could redeem physical labor from ignominy, and sweep away the external differences and inequalities that divide a man from his fellows** (emphasis added).<sup>224</sup>

Back in 1981, the editorial page of the *Wall Street Journal* argued that national service would constitute a “means for acculturation, acquainting young people with their fellow Americans of all different races, creeds, and economic backgrounds.”<sup>225</sup> Shared experiences lead to a shared sense of unity.

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

And so my fellow Americans, ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country.

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<sup>223</sup> Magee, *From Selective Service to National Service*, 7.

<sup>224</sup> Cohen, 146.

<sup>225</sup> Cited in Robert E. Litan, “The Obligations of September 11, 2001: The Case for Universal Service,” in ed. E.J. Dionne, Jr., Kayla Meltzer Drogosz, and Robert E. Litan, *United We Serve: National Service and the Future of Citizenship* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 104.

John F. Kennedy<sup>226</sup>

Make the choice to serve in a cause larger than your wants, larger than yourself, and in your days you will add not just to the wealth of our country, but to its character.

President George Bush<sup>227</sup>

The only way to get a volunteer army is to draft it.

Representative F. Edward Hebert<sup>228</sup>

During World War II, Archibald MacLeish, poet and Librarian of Congress, asked: How do we give the people of this country the conviction that this is their war...and not the generals' war—not the admirals' war?"<sup>229</sup> His answer was to draft the people. For the protracted conflicts and wars in America's history, only conscription was able to supply the necessary forces. At the start of this monograph, the Marshall Saint Cyr epigraph emphasized the important role of political institutions and the systems of recruitment they adopt. In his book, *Citizens and Soldiers*, Professor Cohen quoted General Louis Trochu who argued that systems of military service must be treated as political institutions because of the "direct, powerful, and permanent effect they have on the dearest interests, aspirations, mores, and practices of the entire population."<sup>230</sup> And in the American political system throughout our history, there have been various political institutions and actors that have had dominant roles in ensuring the adoption of a military draft to meet the manpower needs of the nation when confronting a prolonged and significant threat. Given the success of these different actors in the nation's past, the current security environment, and the continued threat from global terrorism, one cannot definitively state that the draft is no longer a viable manpower solution for the United States. In fact, we may now be in the midst of a draft policy window for the fifth time in our nation's history and just do not realize it as of yet.

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<sup>226</sup> Bartlett, 799.

<sup>227</sup> "The Inaugural Address," *The New York Times*, 21 January 2005, A16-17.

<sup>228</sup> O'Sullivan and Meckler, 228.

<sup>229</sup> Flynn, "The Draft," 3.

<sup>230</sup> Quoted in Cohen, 20.

“Who shall serve” is a fundamental question that goes to the heart of the duty a citizen has in a democracy. The tension in the American ideals of liberty or equality is such as Professor Cohen argued “that a substantial, vocal, and philosophical coherent portion of American society will always be deeply troubled by whatever choice is made.”<sup>231</sup> Assuming for a moment that the current recruiting woes can be solved by simply increasing incentives and adding recruiters, one is still left with the fundamental problem that the military faces becoming increasingly isolated from the society it is supposed to protect when the most well-off and best educated do not serve and have little understanding of the military. When Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld graduated from Princeton back in 1954, he chose to serve three years as a Navy aviator. More than two out of three of his Princeton classmates also served on active duty. In 2001, only two members of Princeton’s graduating class chose to serve in the military.<sup>232</sup>

General Gordon Sullivan, former Army Chief of Staff and president of the Association of the U.S. Army, stated: “The Army and, indeed, all the services need an increase in end strength to meet the high operational tempo that shows little sign of abating in the continuing war on terrorism.”<sup>233</sup> Currently, the Army is adding 30,000 troops to increase its end strength temporarily to 512,400. Other politicians, scholars, and retired officers are calling for significantly even greater increases in force levels.<sup>234</sup> With the major problems with recruiting though, where will

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<sup>231</sup> Ibid., 151.

<sup>232</sup> Shields, A23.

<sup>233</sup> Lewis Sorley, “Reserve Components Looking Back to Look Ahead,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 36 (2005): 22-23.

<sup>234</sup> Historian Max Boot wrote that “the U.S. armed forces should add at least 100,000 extra soldiers, and probably a good deal more.” Major General (Ret.) Robert Scales argued for an increase of ground forces by at least 150,000 over the next four years. And military historian Frederick Kagan wrote of 200,000 new troops or more. See Max Boot, “The Struggle to Transform the Military,” *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 2 (March/April 2005): 103-118; Robert H. Scales, “Ground Forces Too Small,” *Washington Times*, 25 January 2005, 17; and Frederick W. Kagan, “The Army We Have,” *Weekly Standard*, 27 December 2004, 9.

this increased manpower come from without lowering standards? The Secretary of Defense argues that this strain will be eased by adding recruiters and increasing incentives.<sup>235</sup>

What happens when we experience what happened to Army recruiters in Fall River, Massachusetts back in 1973? That year, the city had a 7.2 percent unemployment rate. The recruiters placed an ad in the local paper offering a \$1,500 enlistment bonus, but the paper misprinted the bonus as \$15,000. The worried recruiters did not have to tell any prospective volunteers about the mistake because no one showed up asking about the bonus.<sup>236</sup> If the military keeps offering greater incentives, but does not meet its recruiting requirements, such a problem could result in a policy window opening for conscription. Retired Major General Edward Atkeson, a senior fellow at the Institute of Land Warfare, stated that “the all-volunteer force is close to breaking right now...When it does break, that’s when you’ll see the draft come back.”<sup>237</sup>

The Secretary of the Army told the *European Stars and Stripes* that “we’re going to do some out-of-the-box thinking.”<sup>238</sup> Rather than wait for this breakage or simply discussing increasing incentives and educational benefits, and adding recruiters, what is urgently needed now is a public discussion on the necessity for a national service program and/or a return to conscription. Unfortunately, with all the current public debate on Social Security reform, the draft has replaced Social Security as the third rail of American politics. A serious public debate on the merits of a military draft or national service program is necessary. It is hard to build a consensus though when no one is really talking abut this important issue.

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<sup>235</sup> Siobhan McDonough, “Rumsfeld Says Troop Strain Will Be Eased By Stepped Recruiting, Rentetion,” *Houston Chronicle*, 7 February 2005, accessed at <http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20050207350457.html>.

<sup>236</sup> Flynn, “The Draft,” 271.

<sup>237</sup> Jon R. Anderson, “Army Vice Chief Of Staff Cody Worried About Future Of All-Volunteer Military,” *European Stars and Stripes*, 19 March 2005, accessed at <http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20050319358428.html>.

<sup>238</sup> Scott Schonauer, “Army’s Top Civilian Leader Says Service To Pull Out All Stops To Boost Force,” *European Stars and Stripes*, 21 March 2005, accessed at <http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20050322359178.html>.

Professor Andrew Bacevich, a retired Army colonel, recently wrote that military is overextended and “there is no waging a global war without first mobilizing the nation.” He argued that “reconciling strategic ends and means is today the paramount issue facing the United States. Prior to Nov. 2, political calculations might have suggested the desirability of postponing a decision. But these considerations no longer pertain....Three years into Mr. Bush’s global war on terror, the time for dithering is long past.”<sup>239</sup> Morris Janowitz, the noted military sociologist, understood the military manpower dilemma confronting the United States: “We have too many young men for a selective service system; and, on the other hand, military manpower requirements are too large to rely upon a voluntary system. A national service system is designed precisely to deal with this dilemma.”<sup>240</sup> If President Bush does not want to match the rhetoric from his State of the Union address with action and other civilian leaders will not take the lead, then our military leaders need to step forward just as Major General Scott did prior to World War I. Having a reliable manpower system would reaffirm America’s seriousness of purpose in waging the war on terrorism.

America’s military is clearly stressed. After 32 years of the AVF, the United States is in urgent need of a new manpower policy in order to adequately maintain the needed forces to protect the nation and fight the war on terrorism successfully. The passage of a volunteer national service program that calls for military or civilian service will make our nation stronger, both domestically and internationally. Domestically, service to the nation shared equally by all citizens will bring Americans together. Internationally, having an adequate military force structure as well as a robust homeland security force sends a clear signal to America’s allies and enemies that the nation is committed to winning the war on terrorism.

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<sup>239</sup> Andrew J. Bacevich, “Overextended,” *Wall Street Journal*, 10 December 2004, 14. Accessed at <http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20041210341095.html>.

<sup>240</sup> Morris Janowitz, “The case for a national service system,” *The Public Interest* 5 (Fall 1966): 99-100.

Many politicians and military leaders plan to appeal to patriotism and issue a national call to service as additional ways to improve the current recruiting woes of the AVF. Secretary of the Army Harvey stated, “We’ve got to emphasize the value of service. I mean, we the leaders, Congress, business people have got to say, ‘Serving the country is a noble thing to do. Preserving the peace and freedom of the country is a noble thing to do.’”<sup>241</sup> General Peter Pace, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, added: “**All of us should be talking about the value of service to country. Not just about military service to country, but about young folks finding a niche in society where they can serve the country for some time, in my mind, pay back a little bit what they’ve gotten from this country**” (emphasis added).<sup>242</sup> But rather than view a call for service to support the AVF, what is needed is a call for volunteers to serve in one of four national service areas. By emphasizing one’s patriotic duty as a citizen, appealing for volunteers avoids the problems of compulsion associated with a mandatory universal service program. The military, AmeriCorps, Citizens Corps (for homeland security needs) and Peace Corps would be ideal places to allow young Americans the opportunity to serve their country. And should this appeal fall on deaf ears and the response be limited, then politicians and military leaders would have a real crisis on their hands that they then could use to justify a mandatory universal service program.<sup>243</sup> However, I have confidence that young Americans today would respond to the challenge to serve their country, just as generations past have done.

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<sup>241</sup> Schonauer.

<sup>242</sup> Anderson.

<sup>243</sup> I thank Mr. Robert D. Ford, a former State Director of Selective Service in Pennsylvania, for discussing this idea with me during a telephone conversation on 26 January 2005. See his article “Volunteer draft could replenish military ranks,” *Harrisburg Sunday Patriot-News*, 9 January 2005, F1.

## APPENDIX A: GALLUP POLLS ON THE DRAFT

Gallup Poll Date	Draft**	No Draft**	No Opinion
29-Dec-40	89%	11%	
12-Jun-42*	42%	52%	6%
9-Apr-48	63%	23%	
18-Sep-48	73%	21%	6%
11-Feb-50	57%	33%	10%
5-Oct-56	74%	13%	13%
29-Oct-56	77%	10%	13%
23-Dec-64	63%	23%	14%
7-May-65	61%	37%	2%
26-Jan-69	62%	31%	
6-Mar-77	36%	54%	10%
29-Apr-79	45%	46%	9%
2-Mar-80	59%	36%	5%
20-Jul-80	58%	34%	8%
23-Aug-81	48%	45%	
5-7 Jun-98	16%	81%	
3-5 Jan-03	27%	69%	
24-26 Oct-03	17%	80%	
11-14 Oct-04	14%	85%	

\* Sample was 18 and 19 years old.

\*\* Draft/no draft poll questions include those that asked are you in favor or not of a draft, is it a good or bad thing, and continue draft or depend on volunteers. Table does not include polls that questioned the draft's fairness or how selective service was run

## APPENDIX B: GALLUP POLLS ON NATIONAL SERVICE

Gallup Poll Date	Favor	Oppose	No Opinion
March 29, 1946	65%	27%	8%
May 10, 1946	63%	29%	8%
September 19, 1965	83%	12%	5%
July 3, 1966	72%	21%	7%
January 26, 1969	79%	16%	5%
July 5, 1970	71%	20%	9%
March 23, 1971	68%	25%	7%
November 22, 1973	64%	29%	7%
May 12, 1974*	40%	56%	4%
January 20, 1976	62%	33%	5%
April 30, 1979	77%	14%	9%
July 5, 1981	71%	24%	5%
October 7, 1982	77%	15%	8%
January 24, 1987	83%	11%	6%
Jan 22-Mar 9, 2004**	42%	57%	

\* Sample was college students.

\*\* Sample was teens aged 13-17.

## **APPENDIX C:** **SAMPLE “CALL TO NATIONAL SERVICE” CARD**

### A Call to National Service

**Your country needs you!** Every year, hundreds of thousands of young Americans just like you take up the duty and the honor of national service. There are many ways you can help make your country and your community safe and secure, each with its own challenges and rewards.

**Volunteer and choose!** By committing to serve your country now, you will have the opportunity to choose how you would like to make a difference. You will also earn money for college and may receive favorable status in your college applications. Those Americans who choose not to serve will remain eligible for any future military draft.

Please check the line next to the option of your choice and return this form signed and dated within one month.

**U.S. Armed Forces:** Active duty enlistments starting at 18 months, with an \$18,000 education scholarship.

**Citizen Corps:** 18 months of homeland security service, such as guarding ports and patrolling borders, with a \$12,000 education scholarship.

**AmeriCorps:** 12 months of domestic civilian service, such as caring for the elderly or helping with disadvantaged youth, with a \$7,000 education scholarship.

**Peace Corps:** 24 months of international civilian service, with a \$9,000 education scholarship.

OR

**Register me for the draft (selective service).**

Signature \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

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